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This article addresses a significant challenge to federal Indian law 
currently emerging in the federal courts. In 2013, the Supreme Court 
suggested that the Indian Child Welfare Act may be unconstitutional, and 
litigation on that question is now pending in the Fifth Circuit. The theory 
underlying the attack is that the statute distinguishes between Indians and 
non-Indians and thus uses the suspect classification of race, triggering strict 
scrutiny under the equal-protection component of the Due Process Clause. If 
the challenge to the Indian Child Welfare Act succeeds, the entirety of federal 
Indian law, which makes hundreds or even thousands of distinctions based on 
Indian descent, may be unconstitutional. This article defends the 
constitutionality of federal Indian law with a novel argument grounded in 
existing Supreme Court case law. Specifically, this article shows that the 
congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, which the 
Supreme Court has recognized for nearly a century and a half and which 
inevitably requires Congress to make classifications involving Indians and 
Indian tribes, compels the application of a rational-basis standard of review 
to federal Indian law.  
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Federal Indian law faces a very serious challenge. Since 1790, 
Congress has enacted hundreds of statutes concerning American Indians and 
American Indian tribes. Critics increasingly argue that statutory distinctions 
between Indians and non-Indians are unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. The heart of the challenge maintains that these 
distinctions are based on race and are therefore subject to the strict-scrutiny 
standard of review generally applicable to suspect classifications. In a 2013 
decision, the Supreme Court signaled a willingness to consider that 
argument,1 which may come to the Court soon by way of an attack on the 
Indian Child Welfare Act of 19782 currently pending before the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals.3 The stakes could not be higher. If successful, the equal-
protection challenge has the potential to destroy federal Indian law.  
The purpose of this article is to defend the constitutionality of the 
distinctions that Congress draws between Indians and non-Indians. My 
argument, although novel, is grounded in established Supreme Court case 
 
1 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 570 U.S. 637, 656 (2013). 
2 Pub. L. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963). 
3 In Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 536, 546 (N.D. Tex. 2018), a federal district 
court held portions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 unconstitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as made applicable to the federal 
government by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Although a panel of the 
Fifth Circuit reversed, Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019), the case is now 
under en banc review, 942 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 




law. In brief, I show that for nearly a century and a half, the Supreme Court 
has maintained that Congress has plenary power over Indians and Indian 
tribes. That plenary power, I argue, compels the application of a rational-basis 
standard of review, both by logic and by direct analogy to the Court’s 
longstanding equal-protection analysis of federal immigration law, another 
area where Congress has plenary power. Under the rational-basis standard of 
review, the distinctions in federal law between Indians and non-Indians 
satisfy the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause. 
Beginning with the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, passed as the 
new republic’s thirty-third public law,4 Congress has legislated repeatedly on 
Indians and Indian tribes. Much of the legislation is collected in Title 25 of 
the United States Code, entitled simply “Indians.”5 The executive branch, in 
turn, has issued hundreds of regulations under this legislation.6 The statues 
and the regulations are extensive; they cover almost every aspect of public 
life and many aspects of private life for individual Indians and for Indian 
tribes. The federal government’s expansive authority here is unique. Under a 
line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions dating to 1886,7 Congress has “plenary 
power” over Indians and Indian tribes—in effect, the power to regulate the 
external relations of Indian tribes, the internal governance of Indian tribes, 
the economic activity of Indian tribes, and the health, safety, morals, and 
general welfare of Indians.8 The congressional plenary power even includes 
the authority to recognize or to abolish tribal status and tribal sovereignty.  
Federal statutory and regulatory law draws numerous distinctions 
between Indians and non-Indians, between members and non-members of 
recognized Indian tribes, and between such tribes and all other groups subject 
to U.S. jurisdiction.9 Many of the distinctions include a preference for Indians 
or Indian tribes such that Indians or Indian tribes are treated better than their 
non-Indian or non-tribal counterparts. For example, the Indian Gaming 
Regulatory Act generally permits certain gaming enterprises under tribal 
ownership, even if state law otherwise prohibits such enterprises under non-
 
4 Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, §§ 1–5, 1 Stat. 137, 137–138. 
5 See generally 25 U.S.C. (containing 48 chapters of federal laws governing numerous 
aspects of Indian life, from education and healthcare to grave protection). 
6 See generally 25 C.F.R. (cataloguing hundreds of regulations, including nearly 300 relating 
to the Bureau of Indian Affairs alone). 
7 See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382–84 (1886) (establishing that Congress has 
plenary power over Indian tribes). 
8 MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 37–45 (2016); COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF 
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW §§ 5.02–5.03 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 2017) [hereinafter COHEN’S 
HANDBOOK]. 
9 There are currently 574 tribal nations recognized by the federal government. See NAT’L CONG. 
OF AM. INDIANS, TRIBAL NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES: AN INTRODUCTION 11 (2020) 
(noting that 574 sovereign tribal nations have a bilateral relationship with the U.S. government). 
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tribal ownership.10 And many of the distinctions include a dispreference for 
Indians or Indian tribes, such that Indians or Indian tribes are treated worse 
than their non-Indian or non-tribal counterparts. For example, section 177 of 
Title 25 prohibits any “Indian nation or tribe of Indians” from selling, 
granting, leasing, or otherwise conveying any land or title or claim to land, 
except “by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the Constitution.”11 
In other words, section 177 denies Indian tribes the free alienability of their 
lands. Unlike other landowners in the United States, tribes may transfer their 
lands only to or under the authority of the federal government. 
The equal-protection problem, from the perspective of those who see 
an equal-protection problem, is that the distinctions underlying these 
preferences and dispreferences are based in whole or in part on race. For 
example, the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act extends its preference only to an 
Indian tribe, and it defines “Indian tribe” as a “band, nation, or other 
organized group or community of Indians” recognized as such by the federal 
government.12 A few federal statutes apply without regard to membership in 
a recognized tribe. Under the Indian Education Act of 1972,13 the federal 
government provides educational assistance to any “Indian”—with the term 
“Indian” defined to include a member of a tribe that has been terminated by 
the federal government, a member of a tribe recognized by a state government 
but not by the federal government, a first- or second-degree descendant of 
any such member, and any other person “considered by the Secretary of the 
Interior to be an Indian for any purpose.”14  
Many Indian law statutes refer to race only indirectly. Because federal 
Indian law generally concerns the relationship between the federal 
government and the 574 recognized Indian tribes or between the federal 
government and the members of those tribes, statutory preferences and 
dispreferences often depend on tribal status or tribal membership.15 The 
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,16 for 
example, defines the term “Indian” as “a person who is a member of an Indian 
tribe.”17 And the Indian Child Welfare Act defines the term “Indian child” as 
an unmarried individual under the age of eighteen who is “a member of an 
Indian tribe” or who is both “eligible for membership in an Indian tribe” and 
 
10 25 U.S.C. § 2710. 
11 Id. § 177. 
12 Id. § 2703(5). 
13 Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 334 (current version at scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.). 
14 20 U.S.C. § 7491(3).  
15 Carole Goldberg, Members Only? Designing Citizenship Requirements for Indian Nations, 
50 U. KAN. L. REV. 437, 451–53 (2002). 
16 Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5321–5332 and 
42 U.S.C. §2004b). 
17 25 U.S.C. § 5304(d).  




“the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.”18 Such references to 
tribal membership are effectively references to the racial classification of 
American Indians or Alaska Natives. Under a longstanding Supreme Court 
decision, any Indian tribe recognized as such by Congress must be a 
“distinctly Indian communit[y].”19 Although the precise parameters remain 
vague, a federally recognized Indian tribe must comprise, to some substantial 
extent, people who are racially Indian.20 Thus, whether a federal statute 
specifically refers to individuals of the Indian race or generally refers to 
individuals who are members of Indian tribes, the statute very likely has the 
effect of classifying individuals on the basis of race.21 
That raises questions under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to the federal government through the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.22 Settled constitutional law 
 
18 Id. § 1903(4). The Indian Child Welfare Act defines “Indian tribe” as a federally 
recognized tribe. Id. § 1903(8). 
19 United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913) (emphasis added); see also Sarah 
Krakoff, They Were Here First: American Indian Tribes, Race, and the Constitutional Minimum, 
69 STAN. L. REV. 491, 533–35 (2017) (noting that Sandoval and related cases “affirm that 
Congress's power to recognize tribes and pass legislation concerning them hinges on tribes' status 
as distinct political communities with ties to precontact aboriginal peoples.”). 
20 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 3.02(4). “[T]he only practical limitations on 
congressional and executive decisions as to tribal existence are the broad requirements that: 
(a) the group have some ancestors who lived in what is now the United States before 
discovery by Europeans, and (b) the group be a ‘people distinct from others.’” Id. (quoting 
The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 755 (1867)). Additionally, tribes themselves 
usually require some measure of Indian ancestry for tribal membership. Tribal Enrollment 
Process, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/tribes/enrollment 
[https://perma.cc/LY2B-7GFH] (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). Those requirements typically 
derive from historic federal mandates. Often, a member must be a lineal descendant of 
someone on the tribe’s “base roll” (the tribe’s original membership list, typically compiled 
under the authority of the federal government in the late nineteenth or early twentieth 
century), and many tribes require a specific “blood quantum” or minimum percentage of 
“Indian blood.” Tommy Miller, Beyond Blood Quantum: The Legal and Political 
Implications of Expanding Tribal Enrollment, 3 AM. INDIAN L.J. 323, 323–25, 345–48 
(2014); see also Bethany R. Berger, Race, Descent, and Tribal Citizenship, 4 CALIF. L. REV. 
CIR. 23, 28–29 (2013) (identifying various tribes’ “blood quantum” thresholds for 
membership); Goldberg, supra note 15, at 445–50 (noting explicit federal affirmation of 
tribal voting eligibility provisions closely linked to citizenship); L. Scott Gould, Mixing 
Bodies and Beliefs: The Predicament of Tribes, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 702, 718 (2001) 
(“[R]ace is now an essential criterion for recognizing tribes, approving tribal governments, 
and, among tribes themselves, in defining tribal membership.”). 
21 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 14.03(b)(ii) (“[E]ven when federal 
classifications turn solely on formal tribal citizenship, the fact that Indian ancestry is 
normally required for citizenship as a matter of tribal law suggests that the federal 
classification may be incorporating a race-like component.”); see also Matthew L.M. 
Fletcher, Tribal Membership and Indian Nationhood, 37 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 1 (2012) (“It 
is impossible to avoid the fact that racial ancestry is critical to tribal membership criteria.”). 
22 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
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6 
holds that race is a suspect classification and that a legislative or regulatory 
distinction made on the basis of race is subject to judicial review under a 
strict-scrutiny standard.23 This requires that the legislation or regulation be 
“narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling governmental interest[].”24 
Non-suspect legislative and regulatory classifications generally are reviewed 
under a much more forgiving rational-basis standard, so that the legislation 
or regulation is valid if it is “rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest.”25 Although it is possible for a classification to survive strict-
scrutiny review, this is both difficult and rare. The principal race-based 
classifications that have passed strict scrutiny have been affirmative-action 
programs in higher education.26 
For most of the last half century, the Supreme Court has treated 
federal Indian law differently under the Equal Protection Clause. In Morton 
v. Mancari, decided in 1974, the Court unanimously upheld an employment 
preference for Indians at the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (the BIA) 
against an equal-protection challenge, even though the preference looked in 
part to Indian descent.27 In the Court’s view, the preference was “reasonably 
designed to further the cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA 
more responsive to the needs of its constituent groups.”28 The Court said that, 
as a general matter, any “special treatment” of Indians that “can be tied 
rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians 
. . . will not be disturbed” and that, as a specific matter, because the BIA 
employment preference was “reasonable and rationally designed to further 
Indian self-government,” it did not violate the equal-protection requirement.29 
In effect, Mancari subjects classifications of Indians and Indian tribes under 
federal Indian law to a modified form of rational-basis review. 
Even as general challenges to affirmative action have gained traction 
in the federal courts, the Supreme Court has adhered to Mancari and has 
upheld classifications involving Indians or Indian tribes, whether those 
 
23 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
24 Id.  
25 U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 533 (1973). Occasionally, rational-basis 
review has “bite.” Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 759–
63 (2011). Legislative classifications on the basis of gender or illegitimacy, sometimes referred 
to as “quasi-suspect,” trigger intermediate scrutiny. Such classifications “must serve important 
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives” 
in order to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).  
26 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016); Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343. See 
generally George Rutherglen, Fisher II: Whose Burden, What Proof? 20 GREEN BAG 2D 19 
(2016) (commenting on the Court’s finding in Fisher II that the University of Texas met its 
burden under strict scrutiny). 
27 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). 
28 Id. at 554. 
29 Id. at 555. 




classifications are favorable or unfavorable. Thus, in Fisher v. U.S. District 
Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District of Montana, the Court relied on 
Mancari to reject an equal-protection challenge to a tribal ordinance 
subjecting an Indian, but not a similarly situated non-Indian, to tribal-court 
jurisdiction for adoption proceedings;30 in Moe v. Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, the Court relied on Mancari to 
reject an equal-protection challenge to the federal exemption of Indians from 
state taxation;31 in Delaware Tribal Business Committee v. Weeks, the Court 
relied on Mancari to reject an equal-protection challenge to a distribution of 
federal funds to the Cherokee Delawares and the Absentee Delawares but not 
to the Kansas Delawares;32 in United States v. Antelope, the Court relied on 
Mancari to reject an equal-protection challenge to a federal criminal statute 
that exposed an Indian, but not a similarly situated non-Indian, to a felony-
murder charge;33 in Washington v. Confederated Bands and Tribes of the 
Yakima Indian Nation, the Court relied on Mancari to reject an equal-
protection challenge to the State of Washington’s partial assumption of 
criminal and civil jurisdiction for matters involving Indians or Indian tribes;34 
in Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel 
Association, the Court relied on Mancari to reject an equal-protection 
challenge to treaty provisions reserving fishing rights to Indians.35 
But cross winds have begun to blow. In its 1995 decision in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, the Supreme Court applied the strict-scrutiny 
standard to a federal program that gave contracting preferences to firms 
owned or controlled by “socially and economically disadvantaged” groups, 
including “black, Hispanic, Asian Pacific, Subcontinent Asian, and Native 
Americans.”36 Then, suggesting a possible interest in revisiting Mancari, the 
Court in its 2013 decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl said that the 
Indian-adoption preferences in the Indian Child Welfare Act might “raise 
equal protection concerns.”37 Taking that cue, a federal district court, in 
Brackeen v. Zinke, read Mancari narrowly and struck down core provisions 
 
30 424 U.S. 382, 390–91 (1976). 
31 425 U.S. 463, 479–81 (1976). 
32 430 U.S. 73, 85–87 (1977). The Cherokee Delawares and the Absentee Delawares were 
both federally recognized tribes; the Kansas Delawares were not. Id. at 85. 
33 430 U.S. 641, 646–47 (1977). 
34 439 U.S. 463, 500–01 (1979).  
35 443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979). 
36 515 U.S. 200, 207, 236 (1995).    
37 570 U.S. 637, 656 (2013). For an argument that the Court should have examined the equal 
protection question further in that case, see Christopher Deluzio, Tribes and Race: The Court’s 
Missed Opportunity in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 34 PACE L. REV. 509, 510 (2014). 
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of the Indian Child Welfare Act using the strict-scrutiny standard.38 Although 
a panel of the Fifth Circuit followed a straightforward application of Mancari 
to reverse the district court in Brackeen v. Bernhardt,39 the case is now pending 
before the Fifth Circuit for en banc review.40 Whether through Brackeen or 
some other vehicle, the prospect of the Supreme Court taking a hard look at the 
equal-protection status of federal Indian law seems stronger now than at any 
time since Mancari and the cases decided in its immediate wake. 
From the perspective of Indians and Indian tribes, everything will turn 
on that hard look. If subjected to strict scrutiny, most (possibly all) of federal 
Indian law could be struck down. Again, every statute in Title 25 and every 
regulation issued under Title 25 draws a distinction between Indians and non-
Indians, between members and non-members of recognized Indian tribes, or 
between such tribes and all other groups.41 And those distinctions normally 
incorporate a direct or indirect reference to Indian descent. Federal Indian 
law presents little difficulty under the modified rational-basis review of 
Mancari. But if the Supreme Court replaces modified rational-basis review 
with strict-scrutiny review, how many federal Indian statutes or regulations 
would be found to be “narrowly tailored” to achieve a “compelling 
governmental interest”?42 The threat is very grave. 
This is the equal-protection challenge confronting federal Indian law. 
How is the challenge best met? Scholars and advocates of tribal interests have 
proposed a broad range of solutions and arguments, some more persuasive or 
compelling than others.43 In this paper, I present a defense of the 
constitutionality of federal Indian law, a defense that is novel but nonetheless 
grounded in established Supreme Court case law. Specifically, I argue that, 
for any equal-protection question under federal Indian law, the congressional 
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, which has been recognized by 
the Supreme Court since the late nineteenth century, precludes application of 
the strict-scrutiny standard of review and compels application of the rational-
 
38 338 F. Supp. 3d 514, 532–34 (N.D. Tex. 2018), rev’d sub nom. Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 
937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019), rehearing en banc granted, 942 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2019). The 
district court’s decision in Brackeen quoted the Supreme Court’s equal-protection dicta from 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl. See id. at 533 n.10 (noting that, in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 
“the Supreme Court mentioned that an interpretation of provisions of ICWA that prioritizes a 
child’s Indian ancestry over all other interests ‘would raise equal protection concerns’”). 
39 937 F.3d 406, 427–29 (5th Cir. 2019), rehearing en banc granted, 942 F.3d 287, 289 (5th 
Cir. 2019). 
40 Brackeen v. Bernhardt, 942 F.3d 287, 289 (5th Cir. 2019). 
41 See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
42 See, e.g., Ralph W. Johnson & E. Susan Crystal, Indians and Equal Protection, 54 WASH. 
L. REV. 587, 594 (1979) (“If the modern doctrine of strict scrutiny were to be applied to all 
classifications based on ‘Indian-ness,’ the entire structure of Indian law would crumble.”). 
43 See infra Part III. 




basis standard. This approach yields outcomes that are similar but not identical 
to the results under Mancari, and it broadly validates federal Indian law. 
In brief, my argument runs as follows. I take the congressional 
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes as a given, although I recognize 
that several scholars and at least one sitting member of the Supreme Court 
express skepticism about it. As articulated time and again by the Supreme 
Court, this power is comprehensive; it permits Congress to regulate both the 
external and the internal affairs of Indians and Indian tribes, including the 
health, safety, morals, and general welfare of Indians. Additionally, the 
congressional plenary power is exclusive of state power; it is the federal 
government, not state governments, that exercises this complete regulatory 
authority over Indians and Indian tribes. Over the last century and a half, the 
Court has established the congressional plenary power as a bedrock principle 
of federal Indian law.  
But Congress cannot exercise this power without drawing distinctions 
between Indians and non-Indians, between members and non-members of 
recognized Indian tribes, and between such tribes and all other groups. As a 
matter of simple logic, the congressional plenary power cannot be reconciled 
with strict-scrutiny review of federal statutes that directly or indirectly 
incorporate Indian descent; only rational-basis review permits Congress to 
exercise its plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes. This is precisely 
how the Supreme Court treats a similar plenary power—the congressional 
plenary power over immigration. Under longstanding Supreme Court 
decisions, the exercise of the congressional plenary power over immigration 
is reviewed, for equal-protection purposes, under the rational-basis standard. 
Therefore, the Equal Protection Clause requires only that federal Indian law 
statutes and regulations constitute a reasonable exercise of the congressional 
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes. And for that reason, federal 
Indian law generally satisfies the equal-protection requirement. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The first part sets 
out the argument that the congressional plenary power over Indians and 
Indian tribes compels application of the rational-basis standard and precludes 
application of the strict-scrutiny standard. This is a matter both of logic and 
consistency with the Supreme Court’s approach to immigration law. The 
second part draws out the specific implications of this argument. It shows that 
most (probably all) of federal Indian law, whether favorable or unfavorable 
to Indians and Indian tribes, satisfies the equal-protection requirement under 
the rational-basis standard. It also shows that state-law preferences and 
dispreferences for Indians and Indian tribes remain subject to strict scrutiny 
and so generally fail the equal-protection requirement, except when state law 
implements a delegation of federal power. The third part assesses previous 
scholarly efforts to address the equal-protection challenge. 
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I. CONGRESSIONAL PLENARY POWER AND RATIONAL-BASIS REVIEW 
 
The congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, 
although long settled in Supreme Court case law, remains controversial. 
Several academics object to the plenary power on various doctrinal and 
normative grounds. Justice Thomas has stated his interest in re-examining it, 
and perhaps others on the Court harbor doubts as well. For purposes of this 
article, I take the plenary power as a given. That is, I assume that Congress 
has plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, and I assume that the 
terms of that power are as described by the Supreme Court in a long line of 
cases reaching back to the nineteenth century. I intend, in future work, to 
analyze the foundations of the plenary power doctrine, but it is sufficient 
here to explain the content of the doctrine and to assume that the Court’s 
decisions under the doctrine are generally correct (at least as to their 
holdings, if not as to their rationales). What must be shown are the 
implications of the congressional plenary power for the application of the 
equal-protection requirement to federal Indian law. That is the principal 
work of this Part.  
 
A. Congressional Plenary Power over Indians and Indian Tribes 
 
The congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes is 
unusual in our constitutional system. The federal government is a government 
of limited powers, and Congress may legislate only when it has 
constitutional authority to do so,44 such as when it imposes taxes, pursuant 
to its “Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises,” or 
when it creates lower federal courts, pursuant to its power “[t]o constitute 
Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court.”45 During the middle of the 
twentieth century, the congressional power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . 
among the several States”46 developed into an expansive source of federal 
lawmaking. Once it came around to validating New Deal legislation, the 
Supreme Court determined that “[t]he [interstate] commerce power is not 
confined in its exercise to the regulation of commerce among the states” but 
that it also “extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate 
commerce, or the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make 
 
44 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) (“Every law enacted by 
Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.”); 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803) (“The powers of the legislature are 
defined, and limited . . . .”). 
45 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
46 Id. 




regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the 
effective execution of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce.”47  
Although broad, the congressional power to regulate interstate 
commerce is not comprehensive. It does not enable Congress, for example, 
to regulate the possession of firearms in school zones,48 to create a private 
cause of action against perpetrators of certain violent acts,49 or to require 
individuals to purchase health insurance from private insurers.50 It does not 
grant Congress the authority to exercise a general police power;51 instead, it 
allows Congress to regulate only the channels of interstate commerce, the 
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and activities that substantially 
affect interstate commerce.52  
The congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes is 
qualitatively different. Although not absolute or unlimited, the plenary power 
enables Congress to establish the terms on which the U.S. maintains 
government-to-government relationships with the Indian tribes, including 
whether to recognize tribes in the first instance.53 The plenary power permits 
Congress to expand, limit, or even eliminate tribal sovereignty, and it permits 
Congress to terminate the relationship between the federal government and an 
Indian tribe, thereby cutting the tribe off from all the benefits and burdens of 
federal recognition as an Indian tribe.54 And as a distinct source of legislative 
authority, the plenary power is not subject to the limitations that the Supreme 
Court has recognized or imposed under the Interstate Commerce Clause.  
Importantly, the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian 
tribes includes a broad authorization to legislate as to the health, safety, 
morals, and general welfare of Indians and Indian tribes in a manner “similar 
to the states’ police powers over non-Indians.”55 This tracks the parallel 
congressional power over U.S. “territories and possessions, the District of 
Columbia, and federal enclaves such as post offices, national parks, and 
 
47 United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942); see also NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (“It is a familiar principle that acts 
which directly burden or obstruct interstate . . . commerce . . . are within the reach of the 
congressional power.”). 
48 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
49 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613. 
50 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 552 (2011). 
51 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. 
52 Id. at 558–59. 
53 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.02.  
54 Id.  
55 Id. The assertion of a general federal police power over Indians and Indian tribes is 
controversial. See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, There is No Federal Supremacy Clause for Indian 
Tribes, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 113, 245 (2002) (arguing that “there is no constitutionally 
acceptable justification for claims of overriding federal power” with respect to Indian tribes). 
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military installations.”56 Thus, Congress has the power to create and 
administer comprehensive programs for Indian education,57 health care,58 
housing,59 and other social services;60 to acquire, own, sell, and regulate the 
use of tribal lands;61 to define and to punish crimes within Indian country,62 
including crimes that normally would be defined and punished by state 
law;63 to control the exploitation of natural resources within Indian 
country;64 to regulate foster care, adoptions, child custody, and child 
welfare for Indians and Indian tribes;65 to permit and to regulate gaming 
activities by Indians and Indian tribes, even where such activities would be 
prohibited under state law;66 to regulate the transportation, sale, and other 
distribution of alcohol to and within Indian country;67 to control the devise 
and descent of Indian property;68 to protect and to promote Indian and tribal 
cultural resources;69 and to safeguard Indian graves and Indian remains 
from use or exploitation by non-Indians.70 
 
56 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.02 (footnotes omitted).  
57 See id. § 5.03 (noting that Congress created and funds the Indian Health Service and 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, which has broad authority over “social services, welfare, economic 
development, education, and housing programs.”). 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 “Indian country” is a term of art in federal Indian law, though federal Indian law does not 
provide a comprehensive definition of it. For purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction, 
“Indian country” is defined as 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction 
of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any 
patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) 
all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States 
whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and 
whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, 
the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-
way running through the same. 
18 U.S.C. § 1151. Thus, Indian country includes all lands within the boundaries of a 
reservation, even lands that are owned in fee simple by non-Indians, and all lands outside the 
boundaries of a reservation that are owned in fee simple by an Indian tribe or by members of 
an Indian tribe. By common practice, the definition in the federal criminal code is used in 
civil matters as well. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 3.04. 
63 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 6.01. 
64 Id. § 5.05. 
65 Id. § 6.04. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. § 4.07. 
69 Id. § 20.02.  
70 Id. § 1.07.  




Several points bear emphasis here. First, as articulated by the 
Supreme Court, the plenary power is not just a power over Indian tribes; it is 
also a power over Indians as individuals.71 The Court has referred repeatedly 
to the congressional “plenary power[] over . . . Indians”72 and the “plenary 
power of Congress to deal with the special problems of Indians.”73 Whether 
the Court means for the power to reach beyond individual Indians who are 
members of recognized Indian tribes is open to question,74 but it is clear that 
the power is not limited to Indian tribes as collectives. Instead, it reaches into 
the tribes and applies to individual tribal members.75  
Second, the plenary power is not restricted to interstate commerce.76 
For that reason, Congress can regulate matters involving Indians or Indian 
tribes that it cannot otherwise regulate. This point is foundational to the 
capacity of Congress to use the plenary power as a general police power with 
respect to Indians and Indian tribes. Congress can—and does—use its plenary 
power to do for Indians and Indian tribes what state and local governments 
often do for their citizens and residents, such as regulate land use, provide 
rules for testate and intestate succession, implement public health and safety 
measures, and control education at the primary and secondary levels. It may 
well be, for example, that the plenary power would permit Congress to 
regulate the possession of firearms in school zones within Indian country,77 
to create a private cause of action against perpetrators of certain violent acts 
 
71 Cf. id. § 5.02 (describing Congress exercising authority over individual property in 
addition to tribal property and property held in trust). 
72 United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 408 (1980); see also Bd. of 
Comm’rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 354 (1939) (acknowledging Congress’s “exclusive 
plenary power to legislate concerning . . . Indians . . . .”); United States v. Algoma Lumber 
Corp., 305 U.S. 415, 421 (1939) (noting that “the government has plenary power to take 
appropriate measures to safeguard the disposal of property of which the Indians are the 
substantial owners.”). 
73 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 
193, 201 (2004) (noting that “entering into treaties with the Indian tribes” did not impact or 
diminish Congress’s plenary power over Indians and tribes); Antoine v. Washington, 420 
U.S. 194, 203–04 (1975) (“Article I, § 8, cl. 3, provides Congress with the power to ‘regulate 
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes,’ and thus, to this extent, singles Indians out as a proper 
subject for separate legislation.”) (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551–52). 
74 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.01 n.38 (“The exercise of power under the Indian 
commerce clause is limited to situations in which a tribe has a distinct political existence. 
Laws directed at Indians as members of racial or ethnic minorities must be justified on 
other grounds.”).  
75 Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943, 
968–73 (2002); Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Federal 
Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979, 999–1000 (1981). 
76 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.01 (“The Indian Commerce Clause . . . is not limited 
to regulation of trade or economic activities, or laws that are interstate in character or impact.”). 
77 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (holding that Congress lacked the 
power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act). 
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against Indians,78 or to require individual Indians to purchase health 
insurance from private insurers.79  
Third, the plenary power has broad preemptive effect over state law. 
For this reason, the power is not only plenary but also exclusive.80 In 
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the Supreme Court said:  
[O]ur inquiry is limited to determining whether the Indian 
Commerce Clause, like the Interstate Commerce Clause, is a 
grant of authority to the Federal Government at the expense of 
the States. The answer to that question is obvious. If anything, 
the Indian Commerce Clause accomplishes a greater transfer of 
power from the States to the Federal Government than does the 
Interstate Commerce Clause. This is clear enough from the fact 
that the States still exercise some authority over interstate 
trade but have been divested of virtually all authority over 
Indian commerce and Indian tribes.81 
The inapplicability of state law within Indian country dates back to the 1832 
opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Worcester v. Georgia.82 In reversing the 
state criminal conviction of a Congregationalist minister who lived and 
worked among the Cherokees in violation of Georgia law, Marshall said that 
the U.S. Constitution gives the federal government the exclusive power to 
regulate commerce with the Indian tribes83 and that, within Cherokee lands, 
the “laws of Georgia can have no force.”84  
Although the Supreme Court has allowed some inroads for state 
regulation of non-Indians within Indian country,85 it has “repeatedly affirmed 
 
78 Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked the 
power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to create a private cause of action for violence 
against women). 
79 Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 552 (2011) (holding that Congress 
lacked the power under the Interstate Commerce Clause to enact the individual mandate of 
the Affordable Care Act). 
80 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.02.  
81 517 U.S. 44, 62 (1996). 
82 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 595 (1832). 
83 Id. at 557–62. 
84 Id. at 561. 
85 See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186 (1989) (finding that 
“federal law, even when given the most generous construction, does not pre-empt” New 
Mexico from imposing oil and gas severance taxes on energy extractions from Indian 
reservations); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 
157 (1980) (holding, in part, that the Indian Commerce Clause does not “automatically bar[] 
all state taxation of matters significantly touching the political and economic interests of the 
Tribes,” especially when the taxes do not discriminate against or burden Indian commerce). 




. . . the Worcester decision.”86 Thus, “as a general rule, matters affecting Indians 
in Indian country are excepted from the usual application of state law to the 
ordinary affairs of state inhabitants.”87 Congressional regulation has preempted, 
as applied to Indians and Indian tribes, “state hunting and fishing laws, 
regulatory [and] tax laws, and laws governing such traditional state areas of 
concern as child welfare.”88 Within limits, Congress can delegate its regulatory 
power to the states.89 But unless it does so, it is Congress, not the states, that 
holds and exercises the general police power over Indians and Indian tribes. 
Fourth, the plenary power is subject to the general limitations on 
congressional power imposed by the Bill of Rights. In the early twentieth 
century, the Supreme Court took the view that challenges to the exercise of 
the congressional plenary power were non-justiciable. In upholding 
legislative abrogation of an Indian treaty, the Court said that, “as Congress 
possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary cannot question or inquire 
into the motives which prompted the enactment of this legislation” and that 
“[i]f injury was occasioned . . . by the use made by Congress of its power, 
relief must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress, and not to the 
courts.”90 But that extreme deference to Congress in Indian matters has long 
since given way to the view that the rights provisions of the Constitution 
trump the plenary power.91 Thus, for example, federal takings of tribal lands 
generally trigger the Fifth Amendment requirement to pay just 
 
86 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 6.01. As support, Cohen’s Handbook cites the 
following: Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 159 (1982); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); 
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 168–69 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 
217, 218–19 (1959). See also United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 377 (1886) (affirming  
 federal, as opposed to state or tribal, jurisdiction over certain designated offenses “committed by 
one Indian against the person or property of another . . . on an Indian reservation”); The New 
York Indians, 72 U.S. 761, 771–72 (1867) (holding that the state of New York does not have the 
power to tax Indian tribes); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. 737, 757, 759–60 (1867) (holding that 
the state of Kansas does not have the power to tax Indian tribes). On the preemptive effect of the 
congressional plenary power, see also Clinton, supra note 75, at 1006–08. 
87 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 6.01. 
88 Id. at § 5.02. 
89 The preeminent example of such delegation is Public Law 280. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 
Stat. 588 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.). Enacted in 1953, Public Law 
280 delegates federal criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian country to certain specific 
states. See generally Carole Goldberg-Ambrose, Public Law 280 and the Problem of 
Lawlessness in California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405 (1997) (critiquing 
Congress’s stated rationale for Public Law 280); Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The 
Limits of State Jurisdiction Over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975) 
(exploring the legislative history of Public Law 280 and its effects on jurisdiction over 
reservation Indians). 
90 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903). 
91 Clinton, supra note 75, at 995–97. 
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compensation.92 And federal statutes and regulations involving Indians or 
Indian tribes are subject to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, as applicable to the federal government through the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.93 But of course, to say that federal 
Indian law is subject to the equal-protection requirement is not to say that 
federal classifications involving Indians and Indian tribes are necessarily 
subject to strict scrutiny under that requirement.  
Fifth, as indicated above, the legitimacy of the plenary power remains 
controversial. The difficulty here, which has grown more pressing as 
textualism has gained greater prominence in the federal courts, is in locating 
a basis for the plenary power in the Constitution. The two leading candidates, 
at least in the view of the contemporary Supreme Court, are the Indian 
Commerce Clause and the Treaty Clause.94 The Indian Commerce Clause, 
located in Article I, grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . 
with the Indian Tribes.”95 The Court views “the central function” of the 
Indian Commerce Clause as “provid[ing] Congress with plenary power to 
legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”96 The problem with relying on the 
Indian Commerce Clause is apparent. The Court has held that the plenary 
power authorizes congressional regulation even of the internal affairs of 
Indian tribes and the private transactions of individual Indians. That requires 
an expansive understanding of the word “Commerce”—an understanding far 
more expansive than the Court has allowed for the same word in the Interstate 
Commerce Clause. Even the case that first announced the congressional 
 
92 Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 496 (1937). But see Tee-Hit-Ton Indians 
v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 290 (1955) (declining “to subject the Government to an 
obligation to pay the value” of property taken from the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians in Alaska). 
93 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); see also Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 
430 U.S. 73, 75 (1977) (holding that a group of Indians was not denied “equal protection of 
the laws in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment” when it was not 
included in the distribution of an award from the Indian Claims Commission). 
94 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004); see also Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New 
Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 192 (1989) (“[T]he central function of the Indian Commerce Clause 
is to provide Congress with plenary power to legislate in the field of Indian affairs.”); 
Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551–52 (1974) (“[T]he plenary power of Congress to deal with the 
special problems of Indians is drawn both explicitly and implicitly from the Constitution 
itself. Article I, § 8, cl. 3, provides Congress with the power to ‘regulate Commerce . . . with 
the Indian Tribes,’ and thus, to this extent, singles Indians out as a proper subject for separate 
legislation. Article II, § 2, cl. 2, gives the President the power, by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate, to make treaties. This has often been the source of the Government's 
power to deal with the Indian tribes.”); McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 
164, 172 n.7 (1973) (“The source of federal authority over Indian matters has been the subject 
of some confusion, but it is now generally recognized that the power derives from federal 
responsibility for regulating commerce with Indian tribes and for treaty making.”). 
95 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
96 Cotton Petroleum Corp., 490 U.S. at 192. 




plenary power, United States v. Kagama, specifically rejected the Indian 
Commerce Clause as a basis for the power.97 As long as this point remains 
contested, the Indian Commerce Clause will continue to provide an insecure 
footing for the plenary power. 
The Treaty Clause, located in Article II, is an even more dubious basis 
for the plenary power. It states that the president “shall have Power, by and 
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties.”98 The Supreme 
Court concedes that the “treaty power does not literally authorize Congress 
to act legislatively, for it is an Article II power authorizing the President, not 
Congress, ‘to make Treaties.’”99 But the Court reasons that “treaties made 
pursuant to that power can authorize Congress to deal with ‘matters’ with 
which otherwise ‘Congress could not deal.’”100 This approach, however, 
provides at best an incomplete and imperfect justification for the plenary 
power.  Congress ended the practice of making treaties in 1871; there have 
been no treaties between the United States and any Indian Tribe in the last 
150 years.101 The Treaty Clause, then, cannot justify exercise of the plenary 
 
97 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). The Court in Kagama considered the 
constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act, which made certain crimes committed by Indians 
within Indian Country federal offenses. The Court said the Indian Commerce Clause 
is relied on in the argument in the present case, the proposition being that 
the statute under consideration is a regulation of commerce with the Indian 
tribes. But we think it would be a very strained construction of this clause, 
that a system of criminal laws for Indians living peaceably in their 
reservations, which left out the entire code of trade and intercourse laws 
justly enacted under that provision, and established punishments for the 
common-law crimes of murder, manslaughter, arson, burglary, larceny, 
and the like, without any reference to their relation to any kind of 
commerce, was authorized by the grant of power to regulate commerce 
with the Indian tribes. 
Id. at 378–79. Although some commentators maintain that the Supreme Court first 
announced the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes in Worcester v. 
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), that case is really about federalism—specifically, 
whether the state governments have authority over the Indian tribes. Worcester determined 
that governmental authority over the Indian tribes resides in the federal government and tribal 
governments. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 558–59. Kagama, decided a half century later, 
determined that the federal government has plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes. 
118 U.S. at 384–85.  
98 U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2. 
99 Lara, 541 U.S. at 201 (quoting U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2). 
100 Id. (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)). 
101 Section 1 of the Appropriations Act of March 3, 1871 provides that “hereafter no Indian 
nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized 
as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by 
treaty.” Pub. L. 41-120, 16 Stat. 544 (1871). “The reason for the prohibition was the House’s 
resentment of the Senate’s outsized role in setting Native American policy through its 
exclusive power to ratify treaties.” Michael Doran, Legislative Entrenchment and Federal 
Fiscal Policy, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 40 (2018). 
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power over Indians and Indian tribes as to any tribe with which the United 
States never entered a treaty (consisting, for the most part, of tribes in the 
western part of the country and in Alaska) or as to any matter not covered in 
any of the hundreds of treaties that the United States did make with the tribes. 
On this approach, establishing the legitimacy of any specific exercise of the 
plenary power would require a tribe-by-tribe, treaty-by-treaty, matter-by-
matter analysis. 
Thus, the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, 
although firmly established in Supreme Court case law, stands on a contested 
and uncertain constitutional basis. The leading treatise on federal Indian law 
confidently asserts, in reference to the Indian Commerce Clause and the 
Treaty Clause, that “Congress’s power to give effect to these provisions, 
coupled with the supremacy of federal law[,] provides ample support for the 
federal regulation of Indian affairs.”102 But others are not so sure. Over the 
last half century, scholars and commentators have questioned, criticized, or 
even rejected the legitimacy of the plenary power.103 
 
102 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at § 5.01.  
103 See, e.g., Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm within Public Law, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1829–38 (2019) (summarizing history of the Supreme Court’s 
“dormant inherent powers doctrine”); M. Alexander Pearl, Originalism and Indians, 93 TUL. 
L. REV. 269, 328 (2018) (criticizing textualist arguments in support of the plenary power for 
using “cherry-picked” sources); Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the Indian Commerce Clause, 
124 YALE L.J. 1012, 1082–88 (2015) (describing the original congressional authority as 
restricted to only international treaties and land sales); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Tribal 
Consent, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 45, 73–94 (2012) (arguing that there is no textual basis to 
establish absolute congressional power over Indian tribes); Robert G. Natelson, The Original 
Understanding of the Indian Commerce Clause, 85 DENV. U.L. REV. 201, 212 (2007) (“The 
drafting history of the Constitution, the document’s text and structure, and its ratification 
history all show emphatically that the Indian Commerce Power was not intended to be 
exclusive.”); Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Federal Indian Policy, 85 
NEB. L. REV. 121, 132–33 (2006) (explaining that skepticism of the plenary power gained 
prevalence due to the Rehnquist Court’s “deep suspicion” of congressional authority); Philip 
P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 
433, 443 n.58 (2005) (claiming that the plenary power “was never justified by reference to 
constitutional text”); Saikrishna Prakash, Against Tribal Fungibility, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 
1069, 1086–1105 (2004) (arguing that the Indian Commerce Clause does not textually 
support a grant of plenary power over Indians to Congress); Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers 
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of 
Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 25-27, 77–81 (2002) (asserting that 
the plenary power was established on the basis of extraconstitutional reasoning, “relating to 
colonial discovery and the Indians’ aboriginal status” and that the “constitutionalization” of 
the plenary power has changed over time); Clinton, supra note 55, at 235–46 (arguing that 
Indian Tribes are not subject to federal supremacy); Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and Its 
Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754, 
1760–61, 1765 (1997) [hereinafter Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents] (describing 
the plenary power as based on “fiction,” given its absence in the text of the Constitution); 
 




The academic criticisms have gained some traction within the 
Supreme Court. In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas said of the plenary 
power that he “cannot locate such congressional authority in the Treaty 
Clause . . . or the Indian Commerce Clause.”104 Reasonably enough, Thomas 
pointed out that the longstanding idea of retained, inherent tribal sovereignty 
stands in tension with the congressional plenary power over Indians and 
Indian tribes, a power that includes the authority to terminate tribal 
sovereignty altogether: “It is quite arguably the essence of sovereignty,” 
Thomas wrote, “not to exist merely at the whim of an external 
government.”105 But a close examination of the constitutional basis for the 
plenary power must await another article. For present purposes, I take the 
decisions issued by the Supreme Court since the nineteenth century at face 
value and treat the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian 
tribes as an established point of constitutional law. 
 
B. The Vulnerability of Morton v. Mancari 
 
For nearly half a century, Morton v. Mancari has largely insulated 
federal statutory and regulatory classifications involving Indians or Indian 
tribes from strict scrutiny; if left undisturbed, the case provides a framework 
for the favorable resolution of equal-protection challenges to federal Indian 
law. But Mancari stands on doubtful reasoning, and both courts and 
commentators question its legitimacy, with some arguing that many or even 
 
Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 33–74 (1996) 
(examining the ways in which Congressional plenary power, as reflected in federal Indian 
law, creates constitutional problems); David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: 
The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1579 
(1996) (reporting the position held by some that Cohen and the Marshall Trilogy “unduly 
dignif[y] a congressional power over Indian affairs based on a self-legitimating colonialist 
theory” and condemning “the pernicious potential of plenary power of Congress to divest and 
alter the powers of Indian tribes”); Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present: 
Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
381, 395 n.59 (1993) [hereinafter Frickey, Marshalling Past and Present] (expressing “serious 
qualms about the plenary power doctrine as a congressional sword against the tribes . . .”); 
Philip P. Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of 
Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1204–05 (1990) [hereinafter Frickey, 
Congressional Intent] (citing scholarly criticism that the plenary power doctrine “lacks a 
constitutional basis”); Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 1, 46–55 (1987) (suggesting that there may not be a legitimate basis for 
finding such a broad power); Nell Jessup Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, 
Scope, and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 195, 228–36 (1984) (surveying a series of 
decisions in which the Court repudiated the idea that the plenary power prohibited courts 
from hearing Indian tribes’ constitutional claims).  
104 Lara, 541 U.S. at 215 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
105 Id. at 218. 
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all classifications involving Indians or Indian tribes should be treated as 
suspect. These criticisms make it necessary to reconsider da capo how the 
equal-protection requirement applies to federal Indian law. If the focus is 
shifted from the people who are the subject of federal Indian law—that is, 
Indians and Indian tribes—to the governmental body with responsibility for 
federal Indian law—that is, the U.S. Congress—it becomes clear that the 
nature of the congressional power is central to the equal-protection analysis.  
Mancari involved an equal-protection challenge to an employment 
preference for Indians at the BIA. Congress had authorized the preference in 
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,106 but BIA practice for decades had 
limited the preference to initial hiring decisions.107 In 1972, the BIA 
expanded it to cover “situation[s] where an Indian and a non-Indian, both 
already employed by the BIA, were competing for a promotion within the 
Bureau.”108 A group of non-Indian BIA employees challenged the expanded 
preference as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause (by way of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment). 
The Supreme Court unanimously upheld the preference. Noting that 
federal policies for Indian preferences in “the Indian service” reach back, in 
one form or another, to 1834, the Court said that the “purpose of these 
preferences, as variously expressed in the legislative history, has been to give 
Indians a greater participation in their own self-government; to further the 
Government’s trust obligation toward the Indian tribes; and to reduce the 
negative effect of having non-Indians administer matters that affect Indian 
tribal life.”109 “Resolution” of the equal-protection question, the Court said, 
“turns on the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law and upon 
the plenary power of Congress . . . to legislate on behalf of federally 
recognized Indian tribes.”110 The Court pointed out that all Indian legislation 
makes distinctions between Indians and non-Indians and that, if those laws 
were struck down as a violation of the equal-protection requirement, Title 25 
of the U.S. Code “would be effectively erased and the solemn commitment 
of the Government toward the Indians would be jeopardized.”111 
Then, in a problematic move, the Court said that the BIA employment 
preference did not constitute “racial discrimination” because it was “not even 
a ‘racial’ preference.”112 The Court maintained that the preference, which 
looked to both Indian descent and membership in a recognized Indian tribe, 
 
106 Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 5101–29). 
107 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 538 (1974). 
108 Id.  
109 Id. at 541–42. 
110 Id. at 551. 
111 Id. at 552. 
112 Id. at 553. 




was “political rather than racial in nature.”113 The Court’s aim was to tie the 
BIA employment preference to the federal government’s objective of 
promoting tribal self-determination and to the federal government’s “unique 
obligation” to Indians and Indian tribes, an obligation that the Court attributed 
to the historic dispossession of tribal lands.114 “The preference, as applied,” 
the Court stressed, “is granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, 
rather, as members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and 
activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion.”115 In the Court’s 
view, the employment preference was “reasonably designed to further the 
cause of Indian self-government and to make the BIA more responsive to the 
needs of its constituent groups.”116 
The legal rule that emerged (or that appeared to emerge) from 
Mancari is that any “special treatment” of Indians that “can be tied rationally 
to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians . . . will 
not be disturbed.”117 For that reason, any preference, such as the BIA 
employment preference, that is “reasonable and rationally designed to further 
Indian self-government” does not violate the equal-protection requirement.118 
This, in effect, subjects classifications involving Indians or Indian tribes to a 
modified form of rational-basis review.119 Mancari has remained the controlling 
precedent for the equal-protection analysis of federal Indian law ever since. 
But the decision is vulnerable on several points. First is the Court’s 
insistence that the employment preference was a “political” rather than a 
“racial” classification. The Court said that, “[c]ontrary to the characterization 
made by [the non-Indian plaintiffs], this preference does not constitute ‘racial 
discrimination.’ Indeed, it is not even a ‘racial’ preference.”120 The Court 
reasoned that the employment preference was “not directed towards a ‘racial’ 
group consisting of ‘Indians’” but that it applied “only to members of ‘federally 
recognized’ tribes.”121 This, the Court noted, effectively excludes “many 
individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians’” and concluded that 
“[i]n this sense, the preference is political rather than racial in nature.”122 
 
 
113 Id. at 553, n.24. 
114 Id. at 552, 555. 
115 Id. at 554. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. at 555. 
118 Id. 
119 Cf. COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.04 n.41 (“While the much-quoted standard 
from Mancari indicates a slightly lower level of deference than mere rationality review, the 
case law appears to apply ordinary rational basis review.”). 
120 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553. 
121 Id. at 553 n.24. 
122 Id.  
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 This reasoning is simply wrong. As mandated by federal law,123 most 
federally recognized Indian tribes generally require some measure of Indian 
descent as a condition for membership, such that even an employment 
preference limited only to members of Indian tribes would indirectly 
incorporate a racial component. Additionally, the preference upheld in 
Mancari expressly required both membership in a federally recognized Indian 
tribe and “one-fourth or more degree Indian blood.”124 Thus, as commentators 
have noted, Mancari elided the racial element of the employment preference, 
treating it as a political—and therefore as a non-suspect classification— rather 
than as a racial—and therefore as a suspect—classification.125 
Properly understood, the BIA employment preference was neither 
exclusively political nor exclusively racial. It was both, and that raises the 
question of how a mixed classification should be treated for equal-protection 
purposes. The loose reasoning in Mancari does not resolve the issue; it does 
not really even address it—it simply evades it. That tactic works so long as a 
majority of the Supreme Court is willing to play along—and it is possible that 
a majority will be willing to do so indefinitely in order to avoid the difficult 
confrontation between the equal-protection requirement and federal Indian law. 
But the fiat declaration that a mixed political-and-racial classification is 
 
123 United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913). 
124 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24. 
125 See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 8, at 110 (referring to this portion of Mancari as 
“superficially theorized”); Bethany R. Berger, Reconciling Equal Protection and Federal 
Indian Law, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1165, 1185 (2010) (stating of the Mancari “political rather 
than racial in nature” rationale that, “[a]lthough this might be interpreted to mean that 
classifications of tribal members are not racial at all, this conclusion is dissatisfying, 
particularly because the challenged regulation itself required individuals to be both tribal 
members and have at least one-quarter Indian blood to qualify for the preference”); Gould, 
supra note 20, at 725 (calling the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale of Mancari 
“disingenuous”); Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents, supra note 103, at 1762 
(“[U]nder the [BIA] regulation [in Mancari], then, race, as measured by blood quantum, was 
a but-for requirement of eligibility for the preference. The Court in Mancari did not pause to 
ponder this problem.”); David C. Williams, Sometimes Suspect: A Response to Professor 
Goldberg-Ambrose, 39 UCLA L. REV. 191, 198 (1991) [hereinafter Williams, Sometimes 
Suspect] (“I fear that the Court’s approach in Mancari—denying that Indian law is race-
based—will encourage a fast-and-loose attitude toward the requirements of the Equal 
Protection Clause, because the approach is so palpably a fiction.”); Carole Goldberg-
Ambrose, Not “Strictly” Racial: A Response to “Indians as Peoples,” 39 UCLA L. REV. 
169, 173 (1991) (“[G]iven the typical criteria for tribal membership, it is foolish to call 
classifications involving tribal Indians anything other than ‘race-plus.’ . . . By denying that 
Indian-based classifications are racial, Mancari both defied logic and undermined federal 
policy supporting tribal self-determination.”); David C. Williams, The Borders of the Equal 
Protection Clause: Indians as Peoples, 38 UCLA L. REV. 759, 792–810 (1991) [hereinafter 
Williams, Indians as Peoples] (criticizing the “political rather than racial in nature” 
rationale); Newton, supra note 103, at 272 n.441 (calling the “political rather than racial in 
nature” rationale of Mancari “disingenuous”). 




exclusively political fools no one, least of all those who think that classifications 
involving Indians or Indian tribes should be subject to strict scrutiny. 
One way to reconsider the point would be to ask the questions that the 
Court in Mancari decided to dodge: Does inclusion of the racial component 
in the employment preference taint or otherwise overcome the political 
component in the preference, so that the preference must be reviewed under 
the strict-scrutiny standard? Or does the inclusion of the political component 
purge or otherwise neutralize the racial component, so that the preference 
must be reviewed under the rational-basis standard? It should be readily 
apparent that laying a suspect classification over a non-suspect classification 
(or for that matter, laying a non-suspect classification over a suspect 
classification) should not defeat strict scrutiny. After all, a law requiring 
African Americans with valid car registrations to drive five miles per hour 
below the posted speed limit would include both a suspect classification (being 
African American) and a non-suspect classification (having a valid car 
registration). But who honestly could say that such a law would not 
discriminate on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause?126 
To reframe the point in terms closer to Mancari, if the BIA had 
maintained an employment policy against hiring or promoting any member 
of a federally recognized Indian tribe who was of “one-fourth or more degree 
Indian blood,” the Court presumably would have struck that policy down as 
a violation of the equal-protection requirement. And regardless of one’s 
general views on the constitutionality of affirmative action, the initial 
analytical move should be the same in both cases: Either the combination of 
a non-suspect classification with a suspect classification removes the 
governmental action from strict-scrutiny review, or it does not. Intuitions about 
the unconstitutionality of a driving restriction on African Americans with valid 
car registrations and the unconstitutionality of an employment ban on Indians 
who are members of Indian tribes confirm that the Supreme Court erred on that 
initial analytical move.127 This is not to say that the outcome in Mancari is 
wrong, but it is to say that a critical piece of its rationale is fundamentally flawed. 
 
126 See, e.g., Williams, Indians as Peoples, supra note 125, at 807 (“It cannot be . . . that the 
simple addition of a nonsuspect trait to a suspect one yields a nonsuspect class.”). 
127 The Court used similar bad reasoning in Geduldig v. Aiello to hold that the exclusion of 
pregnancy from a state disability-insurance program maintained by California was not a 
classification based on sex for purposes of the equal-protection requirement. 417 U.S. 484 
(1974). Geduldig and Mancari were both decided on June 17, 1974, although Justice Stewart 
wrote the opinion in Geduldig and Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion in Mancari. In a 
footnote dismissing the equal-protection argument, the Court in Geduldig said that the case 
was “a far cry from cases . . . involving discrimination based upon gender as such” and that 
although “only women can become pregnant, it does not follow that every legislative 
classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification.” Id. at 496 n.20. Echoing 
Mancari, the Court reasoned that “[t]he lack of identity between the excluded disability and 
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The Supreme Court signaled some uneasiness with the Mancari 
“political rather than racial in nature” rationale in Rice v. Cayetano, a 2000 
decision invalidating a provision of the Hawaii state constitution that limited 
voting for the trustees of a state agency to “Hawaiians.”128 The Court determined 
that, in defining the term “Hawaiians” to include only descendants of the people 
who inhabited the Hawaiian Islands in 1778 (the year of initial European 
contact),129 the state constitution used ancestry as a proxy for race.130 Although 
the Court reaffirmed the general applicability of Mancari to classifications 
involving Indians or Indian tribes (and even quoted the “political rather than 
racial in nature” rationale),131 it determined that classifications involving 
“Hawaiians” and “Native Hawaiians” are strictly racial and therefore 
impermissible under the Fifteenth Amendment.132 The Rice Court said that 
“[s]imply because a class defined by ancestry does not include all members of 
the race does not suffice to make the classification race neutral.”133 That 
undercuts the reasoning in Mancari that the BIA employment preference was 
“not directed toward a ‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’” because it applied 
“only to members of ‘federally recognized’ tribes” and effectively excluded 
“many individuals who are racially to be classified as ‘Indians.’”134 More 
broadly, Rice implies that pairing a non-racial classification with a racial 
classification does not remove the constitutional problems associated with 
the racial classification. Whether the Court might revisit Mancari on that 
basis remains an open question.135     
 
gender as such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis” 
because “[t]he program divides potential recipients into two groups—pregnant women and 
nonpregnant persons”—with “the first group [being] exclusively female, [and] the second 
includ[ing] members of both sexes.” Id. In Mancari, the point was that the employment 
preference could not be racial discrimination because it favored some Indians (those who 
were tribal members) but not other Indians (those who were not tribal members). In 
Geduldig, the point was that the pregnancy dispreference could not be sex discrimination 
because it disfavored some women (those who were pregnant) but not other women (those 
were not pregnant). In both decisions, the Court would have been well advised to undertake 
something more than “the most cursory analysis.” 
128 528 U.S. 495, 520 (2000).  
129 Id. at 509. 
130 Id. at 514. 
131 Id. at 514–17. 
132 Id. at 517. The Court also indicated that Mancari would not protect a voting arrangement 
(other than one for internal tribal governments) using a classification involving Indians or 
Indian tribes: “It does not follow from Mancari . . . that Congress may authorize a State to 
establish a voting scheme that limits the electorate for its public officials to a class of tribal 
Indians, to the exclusion of all non-Indian citizens.” Id. at 520. 
133 Id. at 516–17. 
134 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974). 
135 For a close study of the equal-protection issues raised by preferences for Native 
Hawaiians, see generally Stuart Minor Benjamin, Equal Protection and the Special 
Relationship: The Case of Native Hawaiians, 106 YALE L.J. 537 (1996). 




 The second point of vulnerability for Mancari is the Court’s separate 
reliance on the federal government’s “unique obligation” to the Indian tribes. 
In truth, this part of the opinion is muddled (after all, it was written by Justice 
Blackmun). The Court initially framed the equal-protection question as a 
matter of determining “whether . . . the [employment] preference constitutes 
invidious racial discrimination,”136 but it immediately said that “[r]esolution 
of [that] issue turns on the unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal 
law and upon the plenary power of Congress, based on a history of treaties 
and the assumption of ‘guardian-ward’ status, to legislate on behalf of 
federally recognized Indian tribes.”137 Noting that “[l]iterally every piece of 
legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations . . . single[s] out for 
special treatment a constituency of tribal Indians living on or near 
reservations,” the Court correctly observed that finding “invidious racial 
discrimination” in the employment preference would “effectively erase[]” 
Title 25 of the U.S. Code and “jeopardize[]” the “solemn commitment of the 
Government toward the Indians.”138  
This is where matters become obscure. Having made this point about 
the place of Indians in federal law, the Court suggested that it provides only 
“historical and legal context” and quickly moved to argue that the 
employment preference is “political rather than racial in nature.”139 But then 
the Court switched back to the relationship between the federal government 
and Indians, concluding that “[a]s long as the special treatment” of Indians 
“can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation 
toward the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed.”140 It is 
therefore hard to determine how much the government’s “unique obligation” 
provides a justification for the outcome that is independent of the “political 
rather than racial in nature” rationale.  
Quite apart from the slipshod reasoning, the “unique obligation” 
rationale is problematic because, as a matter of positive constitutional law, 
the existence of that obligation is wholly dependent on the will of Congress. 
For more than a century, it has been black-letter law that Congress can 
redefine or even terminate the government’s “unique obligation” to the 
tribes.141 In fact, Congress did terminate its “unique obligation” to more than 
one hundred Indian tribes during the period known as the “termination era” 
of federal Indian law (which ran roughly from the 1940s to the 1960s).142 My 
meaning here should not be misunderstood. In my view, it is incontestable that, 
 
136 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551. 
137 Id.  
138 Id. at 552.  
139 Id. at 553.  
140 Id. at 555. 
141 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379–80 (1886).   
142 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 1.06. 
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as a political and moral matter, the U.S. government has a unique and indeed 
compelling obligation to the Indian tribes and that the tribes have an 
indefeasible claim to sovereignty. But the place of Indian tribes in U.S. law is 
both pre-constitutional and extra-constitutional. However compelling as a 
political and moral matter, constitutional law leaves it to Congress to decide 
whether and on what terms to honor the government’s obligation and whether 
and on what terms to continue Indian tribal sovereignty.  
To suggest, as Mancari does, that the equal-protection status of 
federal Indian law turns on the government’s “unique obligation” to the 
Indian tribes is really to say that the equal-protection status of federal Indian 
law turns on the continuing will of Congress not to repudiate that obligation. 
This leaves the exemption from strict scrutiny of federal classifications 
involving Indians or Indian tribes highly precarious. It necessarily implies 
that if Congress repudiates its obligation to the Indian tribes, any subsequent 
legislation that either favors or disfavors Indians and Indian tribes would have 
to be reviewed under the strict-scrutiny standard. It also implies that if 
Congress terminates federal recognition of a particular Indian tribe and then 
later re-confers federal recognition on that tribe—something Congress in fact 
did during and after the termination era143—the new federal recognition 
would have to be reviewed under the strict-scrutiny standard. Surely Justice 
Blackmun would have written a different opinion if he had thought his 
reasoning all the way through to its problematic implications.  
Mancari thus includes two rationales that potentially justify the 
outcome in the case, but both present difficulties. The “political rather than 
racial in nature” rationale simply mischaracterizes classifications involving 
Indians or Indian tribes, including the classification at issue in Mancari. The 
“unique obligation” rationale leaves the equal-protection status of federal 
Indian law contingent on Congress not modifying or repudiating that unique 
obligation. To compound matters, the relationship between the two strands is 
exquisitely unclear. Is either rationale sufficient on its own to justify the result? 
Are both necessary? Perhaps the most faithful reading of the opinion is that 
the employment preference is “political rather than racial in nature” because 
of the government’s “unique obligation.” That does not really make much 
sense, but it does appear to be what Justice Blackmun was trying to say. 
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court itself appears to have had 
difficulty deciding what Mancari means. The Court has relied on Mancari six 
times to reject equal-protection challenges to classifications involving 
Indians or Indian tribes, but it has equivocated between the “political rather 
than racial in nature” rationale and the “unique obligation” rationale. In 
Fisher v. District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District of Montana, a 1976 
per curiam decision, the Court leaned on both rationales to hold that requiring 
 
143 Id. 




a member of an Indian tribe to litigate a child-custody proceeding in tribal 
court rather than state court does not violate the equal-protection 
requirement.144 The Court reasoned that the tribal court’s jurisdiction did “not 
derive from the race of the plaintiff but rather from the quasi-sovereign 
status” of the tribe and that enforcing exclusive tribal-court jurisdiction 
“further[ed] the congressional policy of Indian self-government.”145 Another 
unanimous decision issued in 1976, Moe v. Confederated Salish and 
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, relied only on the “unique 
obligation” rationale to reject an equal-protection challenge to the federal 
exemption of Indians from state taxation.146 So too did Delaware Tribal 
Business Committee v. Weeks, which rejected an equal-protection challenge 
to a distribution of federal funds to the Cherokee Delawares and the Absentee 
Delawares but not to the Kansas Delawares.147  
But in 1977, United States v. Antelope looked only to the “political 
rather than racial in nature” rationale.148 Antelope held that the conviction of 
an Indian defendant for felony murder under the federal Major Crimes Act 
did not violate the equal-protection requirement, even though the defendant 
could not have been charged with felony murder if he had been a non-Indian 
defendant.149 The classification worked to the obvious disadvantage of the 
Indian defendant and did not further tribal self-government, so the “unique 
obligation” rationale was unavailable to the Court. The unanimous opinion 
read Mancari and Fisher to say that “federal regulation of Indian affairs . . . 
is rooted in the unique status of Indians as ‘a separate people’ with their own 
political institutions” and “is not to be viewed as legislation of a ‘racial’ 
group.”150 Similarly, the Court’s 1979 decision in Washington v. 
Confederated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation looked only to 
the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale in rejecting an equal-
protection challenge to the State of Washington’s unilateral assumption of 
criminal and civil jurisdiction over some, but not all, matters involving Indians 
 
144 424 U.S. 382, 390–91 (1976). 
145 Id. 
146 425 U.S. 463, 479–81 (1976). Although the Court in Moe pointed out that Mancari had 
said that “these kinds of statutory preferences” are not “‘racial’ in character,” it pointed to 
the “unique obligation” rationale as “[t]he test” applicable to federal classifications involving 
Indians or Indian tribes. Id. at 480. For that reason, the case is best read as relying only on 
the “unique obligation” rationale. 
147 430 U.S. 73, 84–85 (1977). The Cherokee Delawares and the Absentee Delawares were 
both federally recognized tribes; the Kansas Delawares were not. Id. at 85. 
148 430 U.S. 641, 646 (1977). 
149 Id. at 644, 646–47. 
150 Id. 
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or Indian tribes.151 As in Antelope, the classification worked to the disadvantage 
of the Indians (the challenge was brought by the Yakima Indian Nation), so the 
“unique obligation” rationale again was not plausible. The Court reasoned that 
the “unique legal status” of the Indians “permits the Federal Government to 
enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise be 
constitutionally offensive.”152 Later in 1979, in Washington v. Washington State 
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Association, the Court returned to the 
“unique obligation” rationale to reject an equal-protection challenge to treaty 
provisions reserving fishing rights to Indians.153 
What, then, is the meaning of Mancari? Does Mancari stand for the 
proposition that federal classifications involving Indians or Indian tribes are 
not subject to strict scrutiny because they are always “political rather than 
racial in nature”? Antelope and Yakima Indian Nation support that reading, 
but Moe, Delaware Tribal Business Committee, and Washington State 
Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel indicate otherwise. Does Mancari 
stand for the proposition that federal classifications involving Indians or 
Indian tribes are not subject to strict scrutiny as long as they further the 
federal government’s “unique obligation” to Indians and Indian tribes? Moe, 
Delaware Tribal Business Committee, and Washington State Commercial 
Passenger Fishing Vessel support that reading, but Antelope and Yakima 
Indian Nation indicate otherwise. Fisher suggests that the exemption from 
strict scrutiny rests on both rationales together. 
Perhaps the most accurate reading of these cases is that federal 
classifications favorable to Indians are not subject to strict scrutiny by reason 
of the “unique obligation” rationale (Moe, Delaware Tribal Business 
Committee,154 and Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel) 
and that federal classifications unfavorable to Indians are not subject to strict 
scrutiny by reason of the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale 
(Antelope and Yakima Indian Nation).155 If that is the best that can be said of 
Mancari, the legitimacy of the decision is rightly open to doubt. On this 
 
151 439 U.S. 463, 500–02 (1979). Without mentioning the “unique obligation” rationale, the 
Court in Yakima Indian Nation said that “classifications based on tribal status and land tenure 
inhere in many of the decisions of this Court involving jurisdictional controversies between 
tribal Indians and the States” and that “the argument that such classifications are ‘suspect’” 
is “untenable.” Id. at 501. 
152 Id. at 500–01. 
153 443 U.S. 658, 673 n.20 (1979). 
154 The federal statute at issue in Delaware Tribal Business Committee, which involved the 
distribution among Delaware Indians of a specified amount appropriated by Congress, was 
favorable to two recognized tribes (the Cherokee Delawares and the Absentee Delawares) 
but pro tanto unfavorable to a non-tribal group of Indians (the Kansas Delawares). 
155 Note that the tribal ordinance in Fisher, which the Court upheld by reference to both the 
“political rather than racial in nature” rationale and the “unique obligation” rationale, was 
favorable to the tribe as a whole and unfavorable to a particular member of the tribe. 




reading, no federal classification involving Indians or Indian tribes is subject 
to strict scrutiny, but the Court cannot identify a principled justification for 
the result. That hardly suggests that advocates of tribal interests should rest 
easy about the future of federal Indian law. 
 Finally, Mancari is vulnerable because of subsequent developments 
under the Equal Protection Clause. When the Court decided Mancari in 1974, 
it had not yet addressed the constitutionality of affirmative action. But there 
has been a lot of water over that dam since then. The Court’s first affirmative-
action case, DeFunis v. Odegard, was brought by a white applicant who had 
been denied admission to the University of Washington School of Law.156 
The school admitted the applicant while his challenge was pending, and the 
Supreme Court dismissed the case as moot on April 23, 1974—just one day 
before it heard oral argument in Mancari.157 Four years later, the Court, in 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, took up the substantive 
question that it had not decided in DeFunis.158 In a fragmented decision, the 
Court upheld the use of race as one factor in admissions for a public medical 
school but rejected a hard quota for non-white students.159 Decisions after 
Bakke generally (but not invariably) have sustained affirmative action in 
higher-education admissions160 but have struck down affirmative action in 
other areas, such as government contracting.161 
It is possible, then, that the reasoning and the outcome of Mancari are 
products of the time the case was decided, a time when the Supreme Court 
was just beginning—in a tentative, uncertain manner—to address affirmative 
action. Mancari came hard on the heels of DeFunis, which had avoided the 
issue. And in fact, the Court in Mancari stressed what it was not deciding just 
as much as what it was deciding. The opinion emphasized that the preference 
“applie[d] only to employment in the Indian service.”162 It did not, the Court 
 
156 416 U.S. 312, 314 (1974) (per curiam). 
157 Id. at 315, 319–20. 
158 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
159 Id. at 316–20. 
160 See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2214 (2016) (upholding the 
university’s affirmative action plan because it was narrowly tailored to achieve the benefits 
of student body diversity); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (concluding that 
the Equal Protection Clause did not “prohibit the Law School’s narrowly tailored use of race 
in admissions decisions to further a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits 
that flow from a diverse student body”). But see Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 275–76 
(2003) (holding that “the University’s use of race in its . . . admissions policy” violated the 
Equal Protection Clause because it was not “narrowly tailored to achieve respondents’ 
asserted compelling interest in diversity . . .”). 
161 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505–06, 511 (1989) (striking 
down a city program that required prime contractors on city construction contracts to 
subcontract with minority-owned businesses because the city “failed to demonstrate a 
compelling interest in apportioning public contracting opportunities on the basis of race”). 
162 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974). 
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said, “cover any other Government agency or activity,” and it therefore did 
not require the Court to consider “the obviously more difficult question that 
would be presented by a blanket exemption for Indians from all civil service 
examinations.”163 In other words, the Court treated the case as particular to 
Indian law, and it did not reach for the broader affirmative-action questions 
that it had avoided in DeFunis and that it would struggle with in Bakke. 
Since Mancari was decided in 1974, the membership of the Supreme 
Court has turned over completely, and, no less importantly, the Court has 
developed more definite views about the constitutionality of affirmative-
action programs. Although the Court has relied on Mancari six times in 
rejecting equal-protection challenges to federal Indian law (Fisher, Moe, 
Delaware Tribal Business Committee, Antelope, Yakima Indian Nation, and 
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel), it has not done so 
once since 1979. Mancari was a unanimous decision, but it is not at all clear 
that the Court would reach the same result today if it considered the BIA 
employment preference as a matter of first impression or if it reconsidered 
Mancari in light of subsequent case law. Perhaps the Mancari equal-
protection approach is an artifact of a Court that was still unsure how to 
address the constitutionality of affirmative action as a general matter; perhaps 
the idea of Indian-law exceptionalism gave the Court an easy answer to a hard 
question. The Court’s most recent move in this area, made in 2013, was its 
statement in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl that the Indian-adoption 
preferences in the Indian Child Welfare Act might “raise equal protection 
concerns.”164 There is little evidence either way about whether the Court 
would analyze a preference for Indians and Indian tribes differently from any 
other race-based preference.  
In short, from the perspective of those of us who are sympathetic to 
contemporary federal Indian policy, the Mancari approach produces 
generally acceptable results in the application of the equal-protection 
requirement. The Supreme Court has never struck down any provision of 
federal Indian law under Mancari. But litigants and lower federal courts are 
putting new pressure on Mancari, and the decision is vulnerable to either 
piecemeal or wholesale reconsideration.165 The case pretends that an 
 
163 Id. 
164 570 U.S 637, 656 (2013). In 2004, the Court decided not to address whether a federal 
statute restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians violated the equal-
protection requirement. United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 209 (2004). A later decision by 
the Ninth Circuit found the equal-protection argument from Lara sympathetic but decided 
that it was foreclosed by Mancari and Antelope. Means v. Navajo Nation, 420 F.3d 1037, 
1044–46 (9th Cir. 2005). 
165  See, e.g., Gregory Ablavsky, “With the Indian Tribes”: Race, Citizenship, and Original 
Constitutional Meanings, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1025, 1030 (2018) (noting criticisms of Mancari 
 




employment preference based on both political status and race is “political 
rather than racial in nature.” That inartful move is transparently false. The 
case purports to rest in part on the “unique obligation” of the federal 
government to Indians, but Congress can abolish that “unique obligation” at 
any time, thereby completely upsetting the equal-protection analysis. 
Subsequent decisions equivocate on which of the case’s two rationales is 
dispositive. And the case was decided early in the arc of the Court’s 
developing views on affirmative action. Mancari has protected federal Indian 
law from equal-protection challenges for most of the past half century, but 
there is reason to doubt that it will continue to do so in the years to come. 
 
C. The Case for Rational-Basis Review of Federal Indian Law 
 
There is another way forward in defending the constitutionality of 
federal Indian law, one that does not rely on the questionable reasoning and 
doubtful future of Mancari but that still draws substantial support from 
Supreme Court case law. The plenary power that Congress has over Indians 
and Indian tribes, as described time and again by the Supreme Court over the 
past 135 years, precludes the application of strict scrutiny and compels the 
application of rational-basis review to federal statutory and regulatory 
classifications involving Indians or Indian tribes. Like Mancari, the plenary-
power approach set out here validates most (or even all) of federal Indian 
law under the equal-protection requirement. And the plenary-power 
approach is consistent with how the Court analyzes equal-protection 
questions under federal immigration law—another policy domain in which 







by litigants); Gregory Smith & Caroline Mayhew, Apocalypse Now: The Unrelenting Assault 
on Morton v. Mancari, FEDERAL LAWYER, Apr. 2013, at 51–55 (2013) (detailing challenges 
to Mancari brought in the lower courts); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 
1997) (suggesting the possibility that, following Adarand, “Mancari’s days are numbered”); 
KG Urban Enters. v. Patrick, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388, 403–04 (D. Mass. 2012) (criticizing 
Mancari as based on an “irrational assumption” about the significance of race and tribal 
membership). See also En Banc Brief of Individual Plaintiff-Appellees at 2–3, 32, Brackeen 
v. Bernhardt, No. 18–11479 (5th Cir., Jan. 7, 2020) (arguing for narrow interpretation of 
Mancari). As Carole Goldberg notes, “affirmative action opponents” have undertaken “to 
confine or to overturn Mancari through scholarly work, litigation, and legislation.” 
Goldberg, supra note 75, at 951. See also Carole Goldberg, Descent into Race, 49 UCLA L. 
REV. 1373, 1375 (2002) (arguing that the courts “use racialization to trigger strict scrutiny 
under equal protection law”). 
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1. The plenary-power approach to equal protection 
 
The argument is straightforward. As explained above,166 the 
congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes is a general police 
power, similar in scope and substance both to the police power that states 
exercise within their borders and the police power that Congress exercises 
over places of exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as the District of Columbia, 
U.S. territories and possessions, and military installations.167 With respect to 
Indians and Indian tribes, then, Congress has the power to control matters that 
otherwise would be subject to comprehensive state regulation—such as 
education, public health and safety, housing, land ownership, land use, the 
protection and exploitation of natural resources, crimes and criminal 
punishment, child welfare and child custody, and testate and intestate 
succession.168 Moreover, this congressional authority is exclusive of state 
authority, preempting the traditional police power of the states, at least as to 
matters within Indian country.169 Although Congress recognizes significant 
powers of tribal self-government, it holds the exclusive authority, as between 
the federal government and the state governments, to exercise traditional 
police power over Indians and Indian tribes. 
But unlike a state’s police power, which is general over all persons 
within the state (apart from Indians and Indian tribes), the congressional 
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes is not general over all persons 
within the U.S. By definition, this plenary power is limited to Indians and 
Indian tribes because the Tenth Amendment otherwise reserves the general 
police power to the states.170 In order to exercise its police power over Indians 
and Indian tribes, Congress necessarily distinguishes between Indians and 
non-Indians, between tribal members and non-members, and between tribes 
and all other groups subject to U.S. jurisdiction. But almost every (perhaps 
every) segment of federal Indian law—whether it references individual 
Indians, tribal members, or Indian tribes—directly or indirectly incorporates 
Indian descent and, thus, race.171  
This is where the conflict between the congressional plenary power 
and the equal-protection requirement arises. The Court cannot both recognize 
the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes and also 
demand that Congress exercise that power without marking off Indians and 
Indian tribes for separate treatment. Congress cannot, for example, provide a 
 
166 See supra Section I.A. 
167 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.02. 
168 See supra Section I.A. 
169 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 5.02.  
170 See Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919) 
(stating that the police power is “reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment”).  
171 See supra Section I.A. 




comprehensive program for the primary and secondary education of Indian 
children without differentiating between Indian children and non-Indian 
children, and Congress cannot recognize or otherwise provide for self-
government by tribal members without distinguishing between such 
members and non-members. The exercise of the plenary power makes such 
distinctions unavoidable. To require that Congress exercise its plenary power 
without using a classification involving Indians or Indian tribes is to forbid 
Congress from exercising the power at all.  
Under the Court’s standard approach to the equal-protection 
requirement, a race-based classification triggers strict scrutiny, and strict 
scrutiny requires that the underlying legislation or regulation be “narrowly 
tailored” to achieve a “compelling governmental interest.” To permit only 
such federal Indian legislation as would pass review under the strict-scrutiny 
standard would be to limit Congress to legislation furthering only 
compelling governmental objectives—hardly the material that makes up 
much of Title 25 of the U.S. Code. The plenary power is so extensive that 
it displaces and substitutes for the general police power of the states; it 
permits Congress to regulate even the most quotidian matters for Indians and 
Indian tribes, such as the number of witnesses needed for an attested will or 
the requirements for obtaining a hunting license.172 This is not the stuff of 
compelling governmental interests. 
The congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes is 
therefore inconsistent with strict scrutiny of federal Indian legislation. 
Recognition of this inconsistency is implicit in Mancari, even though the 
Court clumsily tried to avoid that difficulty by insisting that the classification 
used in the BIA employment preference was “political rather than racial in 
nature.” But the unarticulated premise of Mancari is correct all the same: As 
between the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes and 
strict scrutiny of federal Indian law, one of the two must give way. The Supreme 
Court has recognized the congressional plenary power for well over a century, 
and apart from the doubts raised by Justice Thomas, the Court has shown no 
inclination to reconsider it. The plenary power, then, must trump strict scrutiny.  
For that reason, the right approach in reviewing federal Indian law 
under the equal-protection requirement is to determine whether the 
legislation or regulation at issue is a reasonable exercise of Congress’s 
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes. As discussed in greater detail 
below, this approach is similar to—but different from—the Court’s approach 
in Mancari. Admittedly, this approach implies a forgiving standard of review, 
and it generally validates most federal Indian law (with different effects on 
 
172 It makes no difference that Congress typically allows tribal governments to regulate such 
matters. The critical point is that the plenary power permits Congress to regulate such matters 
as they relate to Indians. 
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state laws). It does, however, reconcile the congressional plenary power over 
Indians and Indian tribes with the equal-protection requirement, rather than 
use the latter to defeat the former. In short, it puts federal Indian law on a 
more definite and more secure equal-protection foundation. 
 
2. The parallel to immigration law 
 
The plenary-power approach described here is precisely the approach 
taken by the Supreme Court for immigration law.173 The Court has 
recognized congressional plenary power over immigration policy for well 
over a century.174 Justice Clark wrote in Boutilier v. INS that “[i]t has long 
been held that the Congress has plenary power to make rules for the 
admission of aliens and to exclude those who possess characteristics which 
Congress has forbidden.”175 In Department of Homeland Security v. 
Thuraissigiam,176 decided in June of 2020, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
congressional plenary power, saying that “the Constitution gives ‘the political 
department of the government’ plenary authority to decide which aliens to 
admit”177 and that “the Constitution gives Congress plenary power to set 
requirements for admission.”178 
The Court’s initial recognition and pronouncement of this 
congressional plenary power in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (also known 
as The Chinese Exclusion Case)179 followed the Court’s recognition and 
pronouncement of the plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes in United 
 
173 To be clear, I am not suggesting that Indians, whether or not tribal members, are aliens or 
that they should be treated as such. Under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, all Indians are citizens of the United States. U.S. CONST, 
amend. XIV, § 1; 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b). But see Cleveland, supra note 103, at 77 (“Natural-
born citizenship for Indians born as tribal members continues to be bestowed by statute, 
rather than as a matter of constitutional right, and commentators have questioned whether 
Congress, under the plenary power doctrine, might retain power to de-naturalize Indians.”). 
Instead, I am arguing that the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes is 
parallel to the congressional plenary power over immigration and that the two plenary powers 
have parallel implications for the equal-protection requirement. 
174 BEN HARRINGTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44969, OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT’S POWER TO EXCLUDE ALIENS 1–4 (2017). See generally David A. Martin, 
Why Immigration’s Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 29 (2015) 
(explaining persistence of plenary power doctrine in immigration law). 
175 387 U.S. 118, 123 (1967). 
176 140 S. Ct. 1959 (2020). 
177 Id. at 1982. 
178 Id. at 1980 n.26. See also Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary 
Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 547 
(1990) (“[I]n general, the [plenary-power] doctrine declares that Congress and the executive 
branch have broad and often exclusive authority over immigration decisions.”). 
179 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889). 




States v. Kagama by only three years.180 Chae Chan Ping was decided in 
1889; Kagama was decided in 1886. The parallels between the two cases are 
striking. Both decisions were unanimous. Both decisions identified a 
congressional plenary power over a defined policy area—immigration in 
Chae Chan Ping, Indians and Indian tribes in Kagama. Both reflect the 
implicit, self-confident assumption of federal supremacy prevailing in the 
decades following the Civil War. And notwithstanding that both decisions 
lean heavily on the endemic racism and nationalism of the late nineteenth 
century, both remain foundational precedents.181 
Additionally, both decisions were unable to locate a precise 
constitutional basis for the plenary powers that they described. Instead, both 
invoked the amorphous but important idea of “national sovereignty” as the 
constitutional justification. In Chae Chan Ping, upholding the 
constitutionality of the Scott Act (which banned the return of Chinese 
workers to the U.S.),182 Justice Field wrote: 
That the government of the United States, through the action 
of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its 
territory is a proposition which we do not think open to 
controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent 
is an incident of every independent nation. It is a part of its 
independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that 
extent subject to the control of another power. . . . The power 
of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty 
belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of 
those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the 
right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the 
government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be 
granted away or restrained on behalf of any one.183 
And in Kagama, upholding the constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act 
(which made certain crimes committed by Indians federal offenses),184 
Justice Miller wrote: 
 
180 118 U.S. 375, 383–85 (1886). 
181 In a thorough and penetrating analysis, Sarah H. Cleveland identifies Kagama as 
inaugurating a “plenary power era” in which the Supreme Court attributed to the federal 
government plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, immigrants and aliens, and the 
territories of the United States. See generally Cleveland, supra note 103. In other words, she 
has explored at length the parallel origins of the congressional plenary power over Indian 
policy and the congressional plenary power over immigration policy. For Cleveland’s views 
on the nativism, imperialism, and bigotries that, in part, motivated the turn toward plenary 
powers, see id. at 258–67. 
182 Pub. L. 50–1064, 25 Stat. 504. 
183 130 U.S. at 603–04, 609. 
184 23 Stat. 385 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153). 
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It seems to us that this [sc. imposing federal jurisdiction over 
the designated crimes] is within the competency of Congress. 
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are 
communities dependent on the United States. Dependent 
largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights 
. . . . The power of the General Government over these 
remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished 
in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the 
safety of those among whom they dwell. It must exist in that 
government, because it never has existed anywhere else, 
because the theater of its exercise is within the geographical 
limits of the United States, because it has never been denied, 
and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.185 
In both Chae Chan Ping and Kagama, then, the Court in effect held that 
power over the policy area in question—immigration or Indians and Indian 
tribes—must be located somewhere in government and that because those 
policy areas directly implicate national sovereignty, the power must reside 
with the federal government and, specifically, with Congress. 
When nearly a century later the Supreme Court confronted the 
application of the equal-protection requirement to laws enacted under the 
congressional plenary powers recognized by Chae Chan Ping and Kagama, 
the Court determined that the proper approach is to use the rational-basis 
standard of review. In 1974, the Court’s unanimous decision in Mancari 
grounded rational-basis review of federal Indian law in the notion that, in part 
because of the federal government’s “unique obligation,” the distinctions 
drawn by Congress involving Indians or Indian tribes are “political rather 
than racial in nature.” Just two years later, in 1976, the Court’s unanimous 
decision in Mathews v. Diaz grounded rational-basis review of federal 
immigration law directly in the congressional plenary power.186   
Diaz considered an equal-protection challenge to a federal statute 
making aliens ineligible to participate in Medicare unless they had been 
admitted to the U.S. for permanent residence and had resided in the U.S. for 
five years.187 The Court noted that the Fifth Amendment protects all aliens 
within the U.S. “from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law”188 but also that “[i]n the exercise of its broad power over 
naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules that would 
be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”189 The Court reiterated its recognition 
of the plenary power of the “political branches of the Federal Government” 
 
185 118 U.S. at 383–85. 
186 426 U.S. 67, 83–84 (1976).  
187 Id. at 69–70. 
188 Id. at 77. 
189 Id. at 79–80. 




over immigration, and it determined that “[t]he reasons that preclude judicial 
review of political questions also dictate a narrow standard of review of 
decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration 
and naturalization.”190 In rejecting the strict-scrutiny standard, the Court held 
that neither the requirement of admission for permanent residence nor the 
requirement of residency for five years was “wholly irrational.”191 The Court 
conceded that, under its earlier decision in Graham v. Richardson,192 any 
state laws regulating aliens generally are subject to strict scrutiny, but the 
Court insisted that there is no “political hypocrisy” in recognizing that “the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s limits on state powers are substantially different 
from the constitutional provisions applicable to the federal power over 




190 Id. at 81–82. 
191 Id. at 82–83. 
192 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
193 Diaz, 426 U.S. at 86–87. The Court in Graham reasoned that alienage is a suspect 
classification that triggers strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. 403 U.S. at 372. 
But under Diaz, federal classifications involving alienage are subject only to rational-basis 
review. 426 U.S. at 83. Additionally, in later decisions, the Supreme Court determined that 
state law classifications involving aliens with respect to “core governmental functions” (such 
as law enforcement and public-school teaching) are subject only to rational-basis review. 
See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 300 (1978) (upholding a state statute limiting 
eligibility for the police force to United States citizens because “the police function is one 
where citizenship bears a rational relationship to the special demands” of the job); Yoshino,  
supra note 25, at 756 n.65 (describing Foley’s determination that policing is a basic 
government function and thus strict scrutiny is not applicable). Commentators have 
questioned whether even Graham provides much protection to aliens. See, e.g., Jenny-
Brooke Condon, The Preempting of Equal Protection for Immigrants?, 73 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 77, 102–03 (2016) (discussing how decisions subsequent to Graham, such as the 
interpretation of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA), have “upheld alienage-based restrictions in state public benefits schemes under 
a rational basis scrutiny historically reserved for the federal government’s immigration 
regulations”). Finally, Diaz itself has come in for heavy criticism. See, e.g., Victor C. 
Romero, The Congruence Principle Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection Review of Federal 
Alienage Classifications after Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 76 OR. L. REV. 425, 435–
37 (1997) (describing the Court in Diaz as having played the “plenary power card” despite 
earlier in Graham finding alienage classifications inherently suspect); David F. Levi, Note, 
The Equal Treatment of Aliens: Preemption or Equal Protection?, 31 STAN. L. REV. 1069, 
1085–86 (1979) (arguing that the Court’s application of a “low standard of review” in Diaz 
was inconsistent with the idea in Graham “that aliens require special constitutional 
protection”); Gerald M. Rosberg, The Protection of Aliens from Discriminatory Treatment 
by the National Government, SUP. CT. REV. 275, 314–17, 324–36 (1977) (arguing that Diaz 
wrongly subjected a federal law to a lower level of scrutiny than the strict scrutiny used for 
laws passed by state governments with regard to the rights of immigrants). 
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Diaz reaches the analytically correct result, and parallel 
considerations should drive the same outcome in federal Indian law.194 As the 
Supreme Court has recognized for well over a century, Congress has plenary 
power over immigration matters and plenary power over Indian and tribal 
 
194 To be clear, I use the term “correct” to characterize the court’s doctrinal analysis—not to 
make a normative judgment about whether it is right that Congress should have plenary 
power over immigration (or over Indians) or whether it is right that federal classifications 
involving aliens (or Indians) should not be subject to strict scrutiny. Instead, my point is that, 
assuming a congressional plenary power over a group that constitutes a suspect class, the 
exercise of that power should be reviewed only under a rational-basis standard. Like the 
congressional plenary power over Indians, the congressional plenary power over 
immigration remains intensely controversial. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 174, at 30 (“It 
almost seems an obligatory rite of passage for scholars embarking on the study of 
immigration law to provide their own critique of plenary power or related doctrines of 
deference.”); Adam B. Cox, Citizenship, Standing, and Immigration Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 
373, 381–82 (2004) (positing that plenary power should not serve as a barrier to 
constitutional challenges in immigration law); Natsu Taylor Saito, The Enduring Effect of 
the Chinese Exclusion Cases: The “Plenary Power” Justification for On-Going Abuses of 
Human Rights, 10 ASIAN L.J. 13, 36 (2003) (stating that “lawyers and legal scholars . . . have 
a responsibility to call into question” the issues springing from the government’s plenary 
power over immigration and Indians); T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF 
SOVEREIGNTY: THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 151–81 (2002) 
(criticizing the plenary power in immigration law); Cleveland, supra note 104, at 124–34 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s shift from a theory based in the Commerce Clause to one 
“of inherent power” in order to justify Congress’s exercise of national power over resident 
aliens); Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration 
and Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1616–19 (2000) (acknowledging that 
congressional plenary power “has been the subject of much scholarly commentary”); 
Motomura, supra note 178, at 547–48, 600–13 (arguing that protecting rights of immigrants 
with “subconstitutional” reasons, without having to confront the government’s plenary 
powers, leads to a series of problems including overbroad, underinclusive, or unpredictable 
judicial norms); Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century 
of Chinese Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 854–63 (1987) (describing 
the “baleful influence” of the Court’s decision in The Chinese Exclusion Case and the need 
for constitutional restraints on Congress’s plenary power over immigration, alienage, and 
naturalization); Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual 
Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 25–29 (1985) (arguing that 
the doctrine of the Chinese Exclusion Case allows “[o]fficial racial discrimination” and 
should “join the relics of a bygone, unproud era”); Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of 
Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 54–58 (1984) (determining that Plyler v. Doe was 
“a fundamental break with classical immigration law’s concept of national community and 
of the scope of congressional power to decide who is entitled to the benefits of 
membership”); Rosberg, supra note 193, at 317 (“[T]he proposition that the federal 
government has nearly limitless power [to control immigration] is open to serious question 
on constitutional, historical, and logical grounds.”); cf. Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary 
Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional 
Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 287 (2000) (“If our immigration 
law is not a kind of ‘laboratory of autocracy’ but is instead simply a part of our constitutional 
law, the Court should say so.”).  




matters.195 In both situations, the plenary power ultimately derives from the 
concept of national sovereignty, and in both cases, the plenary power is 
exclusive and preemptive of state power. In Diaz, the Court acknowledged 
that the federal government cannot exercise its plenary power over aliens 
without drawing distinctions between aliens and citizens—or even among 
aliens—that would fail the equal-protection requirement in other contexts.196 
And in Diaz, the Court understood that this precludes application of the strict-
scrutiny standard and compels application of the rational-basis standard for 
federal immigration law.197 Identical reasoning, mutatis mutandis, precludes 
application of the strict-scrutiny standard and compels application of the 
rational-basis standard for federal Indian law. 
That is entirely proper, viewed in terms of how the equal-protection 
requirement ought to function when the federal government exercises a 
plenary power of this type. Under its standard approach to equal protection, 
the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny whenever government uses one of 
its general powers—such as the federal government’s power to regulate 
interstate commerce or a state government’s police power—in a manner that 
singles out a group for preferential or dispreferential treatment based on a 
suspect classification, such as race or religion. And under the standard 
approach, the Court applies rational-basis review whenever government uses 
one of its general powers to legislate in a manner that singles out a group of 
individuals for preferential or dispreferential treatment based on something 
other than a suspect classification.  
In either case, the Court begins the equal-protection analysis by 
defining the universe of individuals potentially reached by the particular 
governmental power and then looks for improper distinctions within that 
universe. The federal government’s power to regulate interstate commerce is 
very broad, and the universe of individuals reached by it effectively includes 
all persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction. Congress may not, then, use its 
general power to regulate interstate commerce in a manner that singles out 
Asian Americans or Roman Catholics for a burden particular to them. It may 
not, for example, forbid Asian Americans or Roman Catholics from 
purchasing consumer goods in one state and transporting them to another 
state. Similarly, a state’s police power is very broad, and the universe of 
individuals reached by it effectively includes all persons subject to the state’s 
jurisdiction. A state may not, for example, use its police power to impose a 
 
195 For immigration, the Court sometimes locates that power in Congress and the president 
(as the political branches of government) and sometimes just in Congress; for Indians and 
Indian tribes, the Court usually locates that power only in Congress. But that difference is 
inconsequential here. 
196 426 U.S. at 79–80. 
197 Id. at 84. 
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limitation on the number of Asian Americans or Roman Catholics living 
within any of the state’s municipalities.  
Thus, in reviewing the exercise of a general governmental power 
under the equal-protection requirement, the Court’s standard approach 
requires that the government legislate even-handedly as to any suspect class. 
Non-suspect classifications are permissible and do not trigger the 
requirement of even-handedness. For example, Congress, in regulating 
interstate commerce, has established a minimum age for the purchase of 
products containing nicotine.198 Those individuals falling under the minimum 
age are singled out for unfavorable treatment, but the classification is not 
suspect for equal-protection purposes. Similarly, state legislatures, in 
regulating public health, prohibit unvaccinated children from attending 
public schools.199 Again, there is a legal dispreference imposed on a 
particular group, but the group is not defined by a suspect classification.  
This standard approach to the equal-protection requirement breaks 
down when it confronts a governmental power that reaches only a particular 
group that is itself defined by a suspect classification. In those cases, the 
universe of individuals potentially reached by the governmental power is 
necessarily limited to the suspect class.200 This is the problem presented by 
the congressional plenary power over aliens and the congressional plenary 
power over Indians and Indian tribes. Under more than a century of Supreme 
Court case law, it is a hard, constitutional fact that Congress may legislate as 
to aliens, Indians, and Indian tribes in ways that it cannot legislate as to 
everyone else. But alienage is a suspect classification for equal-protection 
purposes; so too is the racial component inherent in Indian descent. It simply 
does not work to require that Congress treat aliens and non-aliens even-handedly 
when Congress exercises its plenary power over immigration because that 
plenary power does not reach beyond aliens.201 Similarly, it does not work to 
 
198 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, § 102, 21 U.S.C. § 301. 
199 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164(7) (McKinney 2019) (“No principal, teacher, 
owner or person in charge of a school shall permit any child to be admitted to such school . . . 
without . . . acceptable evidence of the child’s immunization. . . .”). 
200 Cf. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Politics, Indian Law, and the Constitution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 
495, 500 (2020) (“Indian affairs legislation, by definition, creates classifications based on the 
racial and ancestral status of Indian people and the tribal membership criteria of Indian tribes.”). 
201 A handful of scholars and federal judges have seen this connection between the 
congressional plenary power over immigration and the necessity of rational-basis review of 
federal classifications involving aliens. Victor C. Romero, noting that “as long as Congress 
acts solely within immigration law, affecting only the entry and deportation of noncitizens, 
its plenary power ensures that there will be no judicial review of Congressional alienage 
classifications on equal protection grounds,” argues that “[t]his result has some appeal: a 
sovereignty charged with naturalization powers must make distinctions between citizens and 
noncitizens in order to create a coherent immigration policy, and, to this end, Congress must 
 




require that Congress treat Indians and non-Indians even-handedly when 
Congress exercises its plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes because 
that plenary power does not reach beyond Indians and Indian tribes. 
And as the Court has discovered, it is not even workable, for equal-
protection purposes, to redefine the universe in those cases to include all 
individuals potentially reached by the congressional plenary power and then 
to require even-handedness within that universe. The Court maintains, for 
example, that the plenary power over immigration includes the power to 
make distinctions not just between aliens and non-aliens but also among 
different aliens. Thus, the federal statute upheld by the Court in Diaz made 
some aliens eligible for Medicare (those who had been admitted for 
permanent residency and who had lived in the U.S. for at least five years) and 
made all other aliens ineligible for Medicare.202 The same considerations apply 
to federal Indian law and justify similar results. In exercising its plenary power 
over Indians and Indian tribes, Congress necessarily makes distinctions among 
different Indians, different Indian tribes, and the members of different Indian 
tribes. Those distinctions run from the most basic issues, such as whether to 
recognize a tribe and whether to recognize certain lands as tribal lands, to very 
complex issues, such as whether a particular tribe may exercise its retained 
treaty rights for off-reservation hunting and fishing.203  Just as there is no 
equal-protection requirement to treat all aliens the same, so too there is no 
equal-protection requirement to treat all Indians or all Indian tribes the same. 
Faced with the immense difficulties inherent in trying to apply its 
standard equal-protection approach to the congressional plenary power over 
immigration, the Supreme Court has determined that the exercise of that 
power is subject only to rational-basis review. Federal immigration 
legislation satisfies the equal-protection requirement if the legislation is a 
reasonable exercise of the congressional plenary power. The Court has 
pursued a slightly different approach for Indians and Indian tribes, holding in 
 
establish alienage classifications in immigration law.” Romero, supra note 193, at 435. 
Similarly, Howard F. Chang reasons: “To deny that the federal government has the power to 
discriminate against aliens is to cast doubt on the federal power to exclude aliens. Thus, the 
Court refuses to apply close scrutiny to discrimination by the federal government against 
aliens, especially in the context of immigration policy.” Howard F. Chang, Immigration 
Policy, Liberal Principles, and the Republican Tradition, 85 GEO. L.J. 2105, 2112 (1997). A 
federal district court judge argued that the equal-protection requirement “simply makes no 
sense in [the immigration] context because drawing distinctions between aliens and citizens 
is inherent to immigration policy and the conduct of foreign relations.” United States v. 
Maru, 479 F. Supp. 519, 522 (D. Alaska 1979). 
202 426 U.S. at 82–83. 
203 See e.g., COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, §§ 3.02–3.03 (discussing the primary federal 
definitions of Indian Law, requirements to be recognized as a tribe or member of a tribe, and 
application of federal statute based on these distinctions); id. at § 18.03 (outlining the 
allocation of hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on reservations). 
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Mancari that any “special treatment” of Indians that “can be tied rationally 
to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians . . . will 
not be disturbed.”204 The better approach would be for the Court to harmonize 
its equal-protection analysis of the plenary power over Indians and Indian 
tribes with its equal-protection analysis of the plenary power over 
immigration. Doing so would put the equal-protection status of federal Indian 
law on a more secure foundation. 
 
3. The content of rational-basis review under the plenary-power 
approach 
 
To determine that the congressional plenary power over Indians and 
Indian tribes requires the application of rational-basis review is, as stated 
earlier, to establish a forgiving legal standard. Just as strict scrutiny sets an 
almost impossibly high bar for governmental action, rational-basis review 
sets a low bar that governmental action rarely fails to clear.205 And the 
specific review appropriate for federal Indian law would uphold the 
constitutionality of any federal statute or regulation that represents a 
reasonable exercise of the plenary power. This has important implications, 
several of which are developed in greater detail in Part II.  
A fuller exposition of rational-basis review under the plenary-power 
approach requires, at the threshold, a more precise understanding of the 
plenary power itself. The case law suggests both a broad reading and a narrow 
reading of the power. Under the broad reading, the plenary power enables 
Congress to enact almost any legislation concerning Indians and Indian 
tribes, subject to the general constitutional limits on congressional power 
such as those set out in the Bill of Rights. This broad reading allows federal 
legislation without regard to whether the legislation promotes or harms the 
interests of Indians and Indian tribes. There is considerable support for the 
broad reading in the Supreme Court’s decisions. Among other notorious 
examples, the Supreme Court has said that Congress may unilaterally 
abrogate a treaty with an Indian nation206 and that Congress may take 
“unrecognized Indian title” to real property without paying just 
compensation.207 The broad reading of the congressional plenary power 
includes even the power to renounce the government’s obligation to the 
Indians and to destroy tribal self-government and tribal sovereignty. 
 Under the broad reading, federal Indian preferences and federal 
Indian dispreferences satisfy the equal-protection requirement. Valid 
 
204 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). 
205 Yoshino, supra note 25, at 755–56.  
206 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565–66 (1903). 
207 Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279–82 (1955). 




exercise of the plenary power, on this reading, is not conditioned on favorable 
legislative or regulatory outcomes for Indians or Indian tribes. Superficially, 
this result appears to be a step back from Mancari because Mancari says that 
only laws “tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique obligation 
toward the Indians” qualify for rational-basis review.208 But the Court soon 
compromised that aspect of Mancari. Antelope and Yakima Indian Nation 
applied rational-basis review even to statutes that were disadvantageous both 
to individual Indians and to Indian tribes. 
Under the narrow reading, by contrast, the plenary power enables 
Congress to enact only legislation that protects and promotes the interests of 
Indians and Indian tribes. There is support for this reading in case law as well, 
although even the Supreme Court seems to have lost sight of it. The 
congressional plenary power originated with the federal government’s 
extinguishment of tribal independence during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries and with the moral, political, and legal responsibilities that followed 
from that extinguishment. When the Supreme Court announced the 
congressional plenary power in Kagama, it said that the Indian tribes had 
become “the wards of the nation” and “communities dependent on the United 
States.”209 Consequently, the Court held, the “power of the General [sc. 
federal] Government” over the Indians and the Indian tribes was “necessary 
to their protection.”210 At least in general terms, Kagama understood the 
congressional plenary power as necessary to promote and to protect the 
interests of Indians and Indian tribes. Other plenary-power decisions follow 
that reasoning.211 
Make no mistake about Kagama. The thinking behind the decision 
and the language used to express that thinking reflect an ugly, patronizing 
racism that the reader today finds embarrassing and revolting. Kagama is 
permeated with stark assumptions about European-American superiority of 
 
208 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555. 
209 118 U.S. 375, 383–84 (1886) (emphasis omitted). 
210 Id. at 384. 
211 See, e.g., United States v. Sandoval:  
Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate 
commerce with the Indian tribes, but long continued legislative and 
executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial decisions have 
attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the 
power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protection over all 
dependent Indian communities within its borders . . . . 
231 U.S. 28, 45–46 (1913); see also id. at 48 (referring to the plenary power as the 
congressional power “to enact laws for the benefit and protection of tribal Indians as a 
dependent people”); cf. Newton, supra note 103, at 273 (“Some saw Mancari as the Court’s 
signal that it would in the future ‘tame’ the Plenary Power Doctrine of Kagama by viewing 
it as derived from guardianship duties and thus possibly limited to congressional actions 
benefiting Indians.”). 
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the type that Rudyard Kipling later would call “The White Man’s Burden.” 
And the decision takes for granted that the Indians of the late nineteenth 
century, as “remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in 
numbers,” cannot govern or provide for themselves.212 As hateful as all that 
is today, Kagama nonetheless suggests that the congressional plenary power 
is ultimately a power to legislate only in the interests of Indians and Indian 
tribes—for example, by recognizing tribal sovereignty, by facilitating Indian 
economic development, and by ensuring the integrity of tribal lands, 
religions, and culture. On this reading, Kagama does not give Congress carte 
blanche to undermine or destroy the well-being of Indians and Indian tribes—
for example, by abrogating tribal sovereignty, by taking tribal lands without 
compensation, or by singling out Indians for unique burdens. What counts as 
promoting the interests of Indians and Indian tribes has changed since 
Kagama was decided in 1886, but on this reading, it remains true that the 
congressional plenary power is a power to help but not to hurt.213 
The narrow reading of the congressional plenary power implies that a 
federal preference for Indians and Indian tribes generally satisfies the equal-
protection requirement but that a federal dispreference for Indians and Indian 
tribes may or may not satisfy the equal-protection requirement, depending on 
whether the dispreference in fact furthers Indian or tribal interests. The results 
of that analysis are not necessarily self-evident. Many Indian dispreferences 
cannot be said to further the interests of Indians or Indian tribes, but in some 
cases, the analysis will be close enough for reasonable minds to differ. 
Protecting tribal sovereignty, for example, may mean upholding actions of 
tribal governments that disadvantage individual tribal members.214  
On either the broad or the narrow reading of the congressional plenary 
power, the rational-basis standard would not apply to many state laws 
concerning Indians and Indian tribes. Except for state laws resting on a 
delegation of legislative authority from Congress under its plenary power, 
state Indian laws generally would be subject to strict scrutiny. This is the 
result that should follow as well from Mancari, although some sloppiness by 
the lower courts at times has resulted in state laws being reviewed under the 
 
212 Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383–84. 
213 In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), which marks the high point of judicial 
deference to the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, the Supreme 
Court again justified the plenary power by reference to the Indians’ “dependency” on the 
federal government and the congressional responsibility for “the care and protection of the 
Indians.” Id. at 564. “Congress,” the Court said, has “a paramount power over the property 
of the Indians, by reason of its exercise of guardianship over their interests . . . .” Id. at 565. 
The outcome in Lone Wolf certainly was not benevolent. In that case, the Supreme Court 
held that Congress could unilaterally abrogate a prior treaty and force allotment on the Indian 
tribes over their objections. Id. at 566–67. 
214 See infra Part II.A. 




rational-basis standard.215 Application of strict scrutiny to state laws will have 
mixed results for Indians and Indian tribes. Some state laws are unfavorable 
to Indians and Indian tribes, and the strict-scrutiny standard will provide an 
important means for defeating them. But some state laws are favorable to 
Indians and Indian tribes, such as laws recognizing Indian tribes that are not 
recognized by the federal government.216 Those laws would remain 
vulnerable under a strict-scrutiny standard. 
Finally, the plenary-power approach—again, on either the broad or 
the narrow reading of the plenary power—does not perpetuate the transparent 
falsehood, originating with Mancari, that the distinctions drawn by federal 
Indian law are “political rather than racial in nature.” As long as the “political 
rather than racial in nature” rationale anchors the equal-protection analysis of 
federal Indian law, federal judges with good intentions will pursue the hopeless 
exercise of trying to determine whether particular federal laws belong on the 
“political” or the “racial” side of the ledger,217 and federal judges with other 
intentions will see an opportunity to bring down the whole of federal Indian 
law by pointing out that the classifications inevitably incorporate race. 
Reformulating rational-basis review as a function of the congressional 
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes avoids that problem. 
 
II. APPLYING RATIONAL-BASIS REVIEW TO INDIAN LAW 
 
Using the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes 
as the starting point for equal-protection analysis would validate much of 
federal Indian law; the results for state laws would be mixed. Federal Indian 
preferences would present the easiest cases because, under both the broad and 
the narrow readings of the congressional plenary power, the underlying 
classifications would be subject to rational-basis review. By contrast, federal 
Indian dispreferences would be more likely to draw strict scrutiny under the 
narrow reading of the plenary power. To complicate matters, certain federal 
Indian laws act as both a preference and a dispreference. For example, the 
requirement in Fisher that child-custody matters involving tribal members be 
 
215 See, e.g., Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp. 825, 830 (D.N.M. 1978) (using rational-basis 
review for a state museum policy providing an Indian preference). 
216 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, at § 3.02. 
217 See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership, and Tribal 
Sovereignty, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1041, 1043 (2012) (explaining that courts determine 
whether a classification is political or racial and then base the corresponding level of scrutiny 
on this distinction); Addie C. Rolnick, The Promise of Mancari: Indian Political Rights as 
Racial Remedy, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 958, 967–68, 1026 (2011) (arguing for a framework that 
recognizes that the “political and racial elements of Indianness are inseparable” because 
“[n]either the problems encountered by Indian people nor the solutions to those problems 
can be adequately addressed without attention to both” elements). 
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litigated in tribal court operated to the advantage of the tribe and to the 
disadvantage of the specific member who wanted to litigate in state court. 
Similarly, the exclusion of the Kansas Delawares from the zero-sum federal 
distribution scheme in Delaware Tribal Business Committee operated to the 
disadvantage of the Kansas Delawares and the corresponding advantage of the 
Cherokee Delawares and the Absentee Delawares. With those difficulties 
in mind, this Part shows how the plenary-power approach would play out 
for specific federal and state laws involving Indian classifications, some of 
which have been or currently are the targets of equal-protection challenges 
in the federal courts. 
 
A. Federal Indian Preferences 
 
A number of federal statutes and regulations confer preferential 
treatment on Indians and Indian tribes (or, at least, they are perceived to confer 
preferential treatment on Indians and Indian tribes). As long as Mancari 
remains good law and as long as the Supreme Court continues to apply 
Mancari expansively, these statutes and regulations will satisfy the equal-
protection requirement. Similar outcomes follow from the plenary-power 
approach, on both the broad and the narrow readings of the plenary power.  
Consider first the employment policy at issue in Mancari. In any case 
where both an Indian and a non-Indian were under consideration for 
promotion within the BIA, the agency gave preference to the Indian.218 The 
policy specifically defined the term “Indian” to include only an individual 
who was a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe and who had “one-
fourth or more degree Indian blood.”219 It thus incorporated Indian descent 
twice over: directly, in the requirement of having “one-fourth or more degree 
Indian blood” and indirectly, insofar as most (or even all) Indian tribes 
require Indian descent as a condition of membership. But whatever 
difficulties the Indian-descent component of the employment policy may 
present under the standard approach to equal-protection analysis, those 
concerns recede under the plenary-power approach. The advancement of 
Indians within the BIA represents a reasonable exercise of the congressional 
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, which is dispositive in favor of 
the constitutionality of the preference.  
Next, consider the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, commonly 
known as “ICWA.”220 Congress enacted ICWA after determining that state 
child-protection agencies routinely removed Indian children from their 
families at much higher rates than non-Indian children and that, after 
 
218 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 538 (1974). 
219 Id. at 553 n.24. 
220 Pub. L. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901–1963). 




removal, the agencies and the state courts frequently placed Indian children 
in foster care or adoption with non-Indian families.221 These practices 
presented the obvious and serious concern of undermining Indian familial 
and tribal integrity. Consequently, ICWA overrides state child-welfare and 
child-custody laws in a several respects. It establishes exclusive tribal-court 
jurisdiction over child-welfare and child-custody proceedings involving an 
Indian child who is resident or domiciled on the tribe’s reservation,222 it 
provides for concurrent state and tribal jurisdiction over child-welfare and 
child-custody proceedings involving any other Indian child,223 and it gives 
the Indian child’s custodian and the tribe a right of intervention in any such 
proceedings in state court.224 Perhaps most controversially, ICWA creates 
preferences in adoption proceedings for placement of an Indian child with a 
member of the child’s extended family, another member of the child’s tribe, 
or another Indian family.225 These preferences modify the traditional state-
law approach to custody determinations. To the extent that a tribal member 
who is the biological parent of an Indian child prefers the traditional state-
law approach, ICWA may work to the disadvantage of the tribal member in 
that case, even though it generally works to the advantage of tribes.226 
As demonstrated by Brackeen v. Zinke,227 the recent federal district 
court decision declaring ICWA unconstitutional, the Mancari approach is 
problematic here. ICWA defines the term “Indian child” as an unmarried 
individual under the age of eighteen who is “a member of an Indian tribe” or 
who is “eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of 
a member of an Indian tribe.”228 In the view of some, including the federal judge 
who decided Brackeen, the second part of this definition removes the 
classification of “Indian child” from the Mancari “political rather than racial in 
nature” rationale. After all, the Supreme Court in Mancari determined that a 
classification turning on both membership in an Indian tribe and Indian descent 
was a purely political classification; but under ICWA, the Brackeen judge said, 
the classification turns on either membership in an Indian tribe or on Indian 
 
221 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (statement of Congressional findings antecedent to Indian Child Welfare Act). 
222 Id. § 1911(a). 
223 Id. § 1911(b). 
224 Id. § 1911(c). 
225 Id. § 1915(a).  
226 In Miss. Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989), for example, Indian 
parents had attempted to avoid the application of ICWA so that adoption would take place 
under state law rather than tribal law. 
227 See generally Brackeen v. Zinke, 338 F. Supp. 3d 514 (N.D. Tex. 2018) (holding that 
portions of ICWA violate the equal-protection component of the Fifth Amendment).  
228 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
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descent alone.229 Thus, the judge reasoned, ICWA falls outside Mancari and, 
under the strict-scrutiny standard, fails the equal-protection requirement.230 
To be sure, there are sound—even compelling—criticisms of the 
district court’s technical analysis, and it may well be that the full Fifth Circuit 
or the Supreme Court will hold that the requirements of eligibility for tribal 
membership and biological descent from a tribal member are sufficient to 
bring ICWA within the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale. But 
the plenary-power approach avoids that problem entirely. Under the plenary-
power approach, the relevant question—the only question—for determining 
the correct standard of review is whether ICWA represents a reasonable 
exercise of the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes. 
The answer is self-evident. Child welfare and child custody are matters of 
traditional regulation under the state police power. But the plenary power 
confers on Congress a general police power with respect to Indians and Indian 
tribes, and ICWA rests on that plenary power. Once again, this is dispositive.  
Federal law provides many other preferences for Indians and Indian 
tribes—some of them politically controversial but all of them constitutionally 
valid when analyzed under the plenary-power approach. The exemption from 
state taxation challenged in Moe and the exercise of reserved fishing rights 
challenged in Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel both 
satisfy the equal-protection requirement under the plenary-power 
approach.231 The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, commonly known as 
“IGRA,”232 generally requires states to enter into agreements with Indian 
tribes to allow high-stakes gaming enterprises under tribal ownership.233 
IGRA has generated fierce opposition, not least from non-Indian gaming 
interests. The Reindeer Industry Act of 1937 generally prohibits private 
ownership of reindeer but allows certain Alaska Natives to maintain reindeer 
herds,234 a rule that the Ninth Circuit found problematic, even under 
 
229 Brackeen, 338 F. Supp. 3d at 536. 
230 The district court held that “[b]y deferring to tribal membership eligibility standards based 
on ancestry, rather than actual tribal affiliation, ICWA’s jurisdictional definition of ‘Indian 
children’ uses ancestry as a proxy for race and therefore ‘must be analyzed by a reviewing 
court under strict scrutiny.’” 338 F. Supp. 3d at 533–34  (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Peña, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)) (emphasis in original). 
231 See supra notes 31, 35 and accompanying text. Note that the exemption from state taxation 
is a function not of affirmative federal legislation or regulation but of the inherent inability of 
state governments to regulate Indians within Indian country. The reserved fishing rights are a 
function of a treaty between the federal government and the relevant tribe or tribes.  
232 Pub. L. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 25 
U.S.C.) 
233 25 U.S.C. § 2710. 
234 Pub. L. 75-413, 50 Stat. 900. 




Mancari.235 Similarly, the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act generally 
prohibits any person from taking, possessing, or transporting bald or golden 
eagles, including the feathers of bald or golden eagles,236 but the statute 
includes an exception for “the religious purposes of Indian tribes.”237 And 
Congress has enacted numerous programs to provide education,238 health 
care,239 housing,240 and other social services241 to Indians and members of 
Indian tribes. For all these federal preferences, the critical question under the 
plenary-power approach is whether the underlying statute represents a 
reasonable exercise of the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian 
tribes. Under that approach, they all satisfy the equal-protection requirement. 
 
B. Federal Indian Dispreferences 
 
Those who incline to think that federal Indian law invariably gives 
preferential treatment to Indians and Indian tribes should think hard about 
both the past and the present. Through the long history of the Republic, 
federal Indian policy has often been brutal and inhumane. The current policy, 
in place for the last half century, is one of tribal self-determination, which 
encourages and supports the formation and maintenance of institutions for 
tribal self-government and the development of tribal economies.242 But 
previous policies were far less benign; many were aimed at the eradication of 
tribal sovereignty and the destruction of tribal identity and tribal culture.  
Beginning with the presidency of James Madison in the early 
nineteenth century, the federal government implemented a policy of 
removal—the forced migration of eastern tribes to lands west of the 
Mississippi River.243 Then, as non-Indian settlement expanded westward, the 
federal government changed to a reservation policy, under which Indian 
tribes generally were confined to reservations and “groomed for assimilation” 
into the non-Indian mainstream.244 In the late nineteenth century, the ground 
shifted again when the federal government implemented an allotment policy 
under which tribal lands were parceled out to individual Indians and their 
families, with “surplus” tribal lands made available for non-Indian 
 
235 See Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that the government’s 
interpretation of the Reindeer Industry Act raised a “grave” equal protection question). 
236 54 Stat. 250 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 668). 
237 16 U.S.C. § 668a. 
238 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 22.03.  
239 Id. § 22.04.  
240 Id. § 22.05.  
241 Id. § 22.06.  
242 Id. § 1.07; JOHN R. WUNDER, “RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE:” A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
INDIANS AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 159–63 (1994). 
243 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 1.03. 
244 Id. 
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settlement, resulting in an astounding decrease in the tribal land base.245 
Congress renounced the allotment policy in the 1930s as part of a broader 
federal effort to rebuild tribal institutions and tribal culture.246 But after the 
Second World War, Congress initiated a policy of termination—an 
unprecedented effort to eradicate tribal sovereignty, tribal culture, and tribal 
institutions by discontinuing the government-to-government relationships 
between the U.S. and designated tribes.247 The destructive practices of the 
termination era continued until Congress adopted the current policy of self-
determination in the late 1960s and the early 1970s. 
For the last 135 years, the assumed constitutional authority for these 
widely varied policies, including those most inimical to Indians and Indian 
tribes, has been the congressional plenary power. Consistent with the broad 
reading of that power, the thinking has been that nothing requires Congress 
to use the power to benefit Indians and Indian tribes; and in any case, even 
some of the harsher policies, such as forced assimilation, were thought by 
contemporaries to be in the long-term interests of individual Indians 
(although not of the tribes). The narrow reading of the power, by contrast, 
gives Congress expansive authority over Indians and Indian tribes only to 
protect and promote the interests of Indians and Indian tribes. That, in turn, 
requires greater discernment about the underlying purposes and effects of 
sometimes ambiguous federal legislation. 
For example, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 imposes many (but 
not all) of the provisions of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment 
as constraints on tribal-governmental action.248 The legislation is unfavorable 
to Indian tribes. It represents an unwanted federal imposition of limitations 
on tribal governments that Congress passed over the objections of the Indian 
lobby.249 But the Indian Civil Rights Act is favorable to individual Indians who 
are in a position to invoke its protections, such as the rights of free speech and 
due process, against tribal governments. On the broad reading of the plenary 
power, the favorable and unfavorable implications of the legislation are 
irrelevant; the legislation is a reasonable exercise of the congressional plenary 
power either way. On the narrow reading, the determination becomes 
somewhat closer, although the underlying congressional purpose of 
protecting individual Indians’ civil rights should control the result.  
Consider other Indian dispreferences. The rule in Fisher requiring a 
member of an Indian tribe to litigate a child-custody proceeding in tribal court 
was favorable to Indian tribes but unfavorable to any individual Indian who 
 
245 Id. § 1.04. 
246 Id. § 1.05; WUNDER, supra note 242, at 63–71. 
247 COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 1.06. 
248 Pub. L. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1304).  
249 PETRA T. SHATTUCK & JILL NORGREN, PARTIAL JUSTICE: FEDERAL INDIAN LAW IN A 
LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 169–70 (1991). 




preferred litigation in state court. The Supreme Court, citing Mancari’s 
“political rather than racial in nature” rationale and its “unique obligation” 
rationale, rejected the equal-protection challenge to the jurisdictional rule.250 
The plenary-power approach produces the same outcome in Fisher on the 
narrow reading of the plenary power. The general purpose of exclusive 
jurisdiction for the tribal court was the promotion of tribal self-government. 
It therefore represents a legitimate—indeed, a paradigmatic—exercise of the 
congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, even on the 
narrow reading. And the broad reading of course legitimates the rule of 
exclusive tribal-court jurisdiction, just as the broad reading legitimates most 
or all federal Indian legislation. 
The application of the Major Crimes Act to the Indian defendant in 
Antelope was plainly disadvantageous. The defendant was convicted of 
felony murder even though he could not have been charged with felony 
murder if he had been a non-Indian defendant tried under state law.251 
Invoking the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale, the Supreme 
Court rejected the defendant’s equal-protection challenge. Under the plenary-
power approach, the result is the same under the broad reading of the plenary 
power but different under the narrow reading of that power. The general 
purpose of the Major Crimes Act was not to protect or to promote the interests 
of Indians and Indian tribes, much less of individual Indians. Instead, the 
legislation, which Congress passed because of dissatisfaction with how tribal 
law addressed crimes committed by Indians against Indians, was part of a 
federal scheme to strip Indian tribes of the authority to prosecute and to 
punish felonies. On the narrow reading of the congressional plenary power, 
then, the Major Crimes Act (at least as applied to the defendant in Antelope) 
is not a reasonable exercise of the plenary power and does not shield the 
underlying classification from strict scrutiny.  
There is an important point to note here. Some advocates of tribal 
interests understandably may find it distressing that the plenary-power 
approach subjects some federal Indian dispreferences to rational-basis 
review. That arguably is a step backwards from Mancari, which purports to 
apply rational-basis review only to federal legislation and regulation 
furthering the federal government’s “unique obligation toward the 
Indians.”252 But in fact, the law has already moved past that point. The 
Court’s decisions in Antelope and Yakima Indian Nation ignored the “unique 
obligation” rationale when reviewing challenges to federal Indian 
dispreferences. More generally, the Court has selectively exploited the 
“political rather than racial in nature” rationale and the “unique obligation” 
 
250 Fisher v. Dist. Ct. of Sixteenth Jud. Dist. of Mont., 424 U.S. 382, 390–91 (1976). 
251 United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 644 (1977). 
252 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 536 (1974). 
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rationale to reject equal-protection challenges to all federal Indian 
preferences and dispreferences. The plenary-power approach, on the broad 
reading of the power, yields similar outcomes. By contrast, on the narrow 
reading of the power, the plenary-power approach at least subjects federal Indian 
dispreferences to strict scrutiny when those dispreferences do not protect or 
promote the interests of either individual Indians or Indian tribes. This reclaims 
some of the ground given up by Antelope and Yakima Indian Nation.253 
Finally, the scope of the plenary-power approach should not be 
misunderstood. The plenary-power approach does not have unlimited 
application. It is specific to the equal-protection requirement, and it does not 
insulate federal Indian law from the other provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
The plenary-power approach derives from the need to reconcile the equal-
protection requirement, which generally forbids drawing legal distinctions 
based on a suspect classification, with the congressional plenary power over 
Indians and Indian tribes, which generally requires drawing legal distinctions 
based on a suspect classification. Other rights provisions in the Constitution 
present no such difficulty. Thus, for example, federal takings for public use 
generally trigger the Fifth Amendment requirement to pay just compensation, 
whether the property taken is Indian or non-Indian.254  
 
C. State Indian Preferences and Dispreferences 
 
At least in theory, the states have limited authority over Indians and 
Indian tribes both because the tribes retain inherent sovereignty and because 
the Supreme Court treats the congressional plenary power as preempting state 
power.255 The Court’s foundational decision in Worcester v. Georgia, which 
rejected Georgia’s attempt to regulate the activities of non-Indians on 
Cherokee lands, stated firmly that, within Indian country, the “laws of 
Georgia can have no force.”256 But state laws nonetheless reach Indians and 
Indian tribes in any of several ways. First, state laws of general applicability 
cover Indians living, working, or otherwise present outside Indian country. 
Second, Congress sometimes delegates federal power over Indians and Indian 
 
253 Cf. Johnson & Crystal, supra note 42, at 605–06 (1979) (asserting and describing how the 
Antelope “opinion may be said to expand the Mancari rule”). 
254 United States. v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980). Even there, however, 
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the management of Indian property, the Court distinguishes between compensable takings 
and non-compensable “act[s] of congressional guardianship over tribal property” by 
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the land.” Id. at 389 (internal quotation omitted). 
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256 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832). 
 




tribes to the states. Third, state laws specifically directed at Indians or Indian 
tribes sometimes regulate (or attempt to regulate) Indians and Indian tribes 
despite the broad preemptive effect of federal authority. The equal-protection 
results under the plenary-power approach differ in these different contexts. 
Consider first state laws of general applicability that cover Indians 
living, working, or otherwise present outside Indian country. An American 
Indian, whether or not a member of a recognized tribe, is a citizen of the 
United States and a resident of a particular state to the same extent and under 
the same terms as a non-Indian. Thus, a member of the Cherokee Nation of 
Oklahoma who lives and works in Manhattan is both a citizen of the U.S. and 
a resident of New York, and she is subject to New York law just as a non-
Indian in New York is subject to New York law. Application of the equal-
protection requirement is straightforward here. The Equal Protection Clause 
applies to New York, just as it applies to every other state, and it overrides 
any legislation or regulation of New York or of New York’s counties and 
municipalities that violates its terms.  
State laws of general applicability are not the product of the 
congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, and so they fall 
outside the plenary-power approach. Instead, such laws remain subject to the 
Supreme Court’s standard approach under the Equal Protection Clause, with 
rational-basis review for laws that do not use a suspect classification. For 
example, a New York state income-tax statute applying a graduated rate 
schedule to all New York taxpayers would not differentiate between the 
citizen of the Cherokee Nation living and working in Manhattan and any non-
Indian living and working in Manhattan. It would be subject to rational-basis 
review, and it would not violate the Equal Protection Clause. But a New York 
state income-tax statute applying higher tax rates to New York taxpayers of 
the American Indian race would trigger strict scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause and surely would be unconstitutional—just as would a New 
York state income-tax statute applying higher tax rates to Asian Americans 
or to Roman Catholics. No special analysis—no departure from the standard 
approach to the equal-protection requirement—would be necessary or even 
appropriate to reach those results. 
Next are state laws applicable to Indians and Indian tribes under a 
delegation of federal authority. Although the states generally may not regulate 
Indians or Indian tribes for matters within Indian country, Congress sometimes 
delegates its regulatory authority to the states. The preeminent example is a 
federal statute, known as “Public Law 280,” enacted by Congress in 1953.257 
Public Law 280, which has been widely criticized, generally transfers federal 
criminal and civil jurisdiction within Indian country to several designated 
 
257 Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).  
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states.258 Setting aside specific carve-outs by Congress and retrocessions by the 
states, the following sixteen states, sometimes referred to as the “Public Law 
280 states,” today have full or partial criminal and civil jurisdiction over Indian 
country within their borders: Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, 
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South 
Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.259  
In exercising this delegated federal power, a Public Law 280 state 
may draw distinctions and make classifications involving Indians and Indian 
tribes. For example, the Revised Code of Washington, in accepting partial 
civil jurisdiction over the Indian reservations within the state, provides that 
“[a]ny tribal ordinance or custom . . . adopted by an Indian tribe, band, or 
community . . . shall, if not inconsistent with any applicable civil law of the 
state, be given full force and effect in the determination of civil causes of action 
. . . .”260 The code also provides for the retrocession to the federal government 
of criminal jurisdiction for seven Indian reservations (the Quileute, Chehalis, 
Swinomish, Skokomish, Muckleshoot, Tulalip, and Colville Confederated 
Tribes reservations) but not for any of the twenty-two other Indian reservations 
within the state.261 Under the Supreme Court’s standard approach to the equal-
protection requirement, these distinctions and classifications are problematic 
because they directly or indirectly incorporate Indian descent. 
Using the plenary-power approach, the equal-protection analysis of 
state laws enacted under a delegation of the congressional plenary power 
follows the equal-protection analysis of federal Indian laws. Thus, if such a 
statute or regulation represents a reasonable exercise of the plenary power, it 
satisfies the equal-protection requirement. This is effectively the same result 
that the Supreme Court has reached under Mancari. In Yakima Indian Nation, 
the Court used Mancari to reject an equal-protection challenge brought by 
Indian tribes to the State of Washington’s assumption of partial civil and 
criminal jurisdiction under Public Law 280.262  
Much more problematic would be state laws involving Indians or 
Indian tribes that are not enacted pursuant to a delegation of the congressional 
plenary power. Consider, for example, a hypothetical state statute denying 
Indians and tribal members licenses for non-treaty fishing. During the 1960s 
 
258 18 U.S.C. § 1162. The original transfers of jurisdiction were made either unilaterally by 
the federal government or by agreement between the federal government and the relevant 
state government—but without the consent of the affected tribes. However, the Indian Civil 
Rights Act of 1968 provides that no additional jurisdictional transfers may be made without 
tribal consent—and, in fact, no additional transfers have been made since. 25 U.S.C. § 1326. 
259 Carole Goldberg, Questions and Answers about Public Law 280, TRIBAL LAW AND 
POLICY INSTITUTE, http://www.tribal-institute.org/articles/goldberg.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
9KDB-6D2H]. 
260 WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.070 (2020). 
261 WASH. REV. CODE § 37.12.100 (2020). 
262 Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500–01 (1979). 




and the 1970s, attempts by tribal members in the State of Washington to 
exercise their treaty-based, off-reservation fishing rights provoked a vicious 
backlash among non-Indian fishing interests. The conflict culminated in a 
decision by a federal district court judge to enforce the Indians’ right to fish in 
what the treaties call the tribes’ “usual and accustomed” fishing places.263 The 
district court’s ruling ultimately was upheld by the Supreme Court,264 and 
various sub-proceedings in the case continue to the present.265 It is said by 
some to be the longest-running civil matter in the history of the federal courts. 
Suppose that the State of Washington—which resisted the district 
court’s ruling with all the tenacity and ugliness of the southern states in 
resisting desegregation during the 1950s and the 1960s266—had passed a 
statute categorically denying commercial and recreational fishing licenses to 
any Indian outside the “usual and accustomed” fishing areas covered by the 
treaties. That hypothetical statute would have differentiated between Indians 
and non-Indians, thereby incorporating the suspect classification of race. And 
the hypothetical statute would not have been enacted pursuant to a delegation 
of the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes. The 
statute, therefore, would have been reviewed under the Supreme Court’s 
standard approach to the Equal Protection Clause; it would have triggered 
strict scrutiny, and it surely would have been unconstitutional.267 
Note that the plenary-power approach would not protect state laws 
giving preferential or dispreferential treatment to Indians or Indian tribes 
from strict scrutiny under the equal-protection requirement. The lower level 
of scrutiny turns precisely on the plenary power over Indians and Indian 
tribes, and that power is an attribute of the federal government rather than of 
the states. This arguably represents a departure of sorts from the case law 
under Mancari. Although a few federal courts have held that the Mancari 
framework does not apply to state statutes not enacted under a delegation of 
 
263 United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 333 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 
676 (9th Cir. 1975). 
264 Washington v. Wash. State Comm. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979). 
265 See, e.g., Washington v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1832, 1832 (2018) (per curiam) 
(affirming judgment “by an equally divided court” in on-going sub-proceeding case). 
266 Puget Sound Gillnetters Ass’n v. United States District Court, 573 F.2d 1123, 1126 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (“Agencies of the State of Washington and various of its constituencies continue 
to attack the judgment in United States v. Washington . . . . The state's extraordinary 
machinations in resisting the decree have forced the district court to take over a large share 
of the management of the state's fishery in order to enforce its decrees. Except for some 
desegregation cases . . . the district court has faced the most concerted official and private 
efforts to frustrate a decree of a federal court witnessed in this century.”). 
267 See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 8, § 14.03 (“Most states at one time or another have 
enacted particular laws treating Indians as a distinct class. When these are based simply on 
discrimination against Indians unrelated to the distinct status of tribes, they are invalid under 
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the statutes enforcing them.”). 
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the congressional plenary power,268 some have held otherwise, including the 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.269 
 
III. OTHER RESPONSES TO THE EQUAL-PROTECTION CHALLENGE 
 
Scholars writing about federal Indian law have offered a number of 
responses to the equal-protection challenge. These range from reiterating and 
defending the basic reasoning of Mancari (usually with modifications) to 
arguing that the equal-protection requirement categorically does not apply to 
classifications involving Indians or Indian tribes. Like the plenary-power 
approach, these responses generally defend the constitutionality of federal 
Indian law, and like the plenary-power approach, they generally are not 
necessary if the Supreme Court respects the Mancari line of cases. In my 
view, the plenary-power approach presents the best option for persuading the 
Supreme Court to reject the equal-protection challenge to federal Indian law 
if the Court does not adhere to Mancari. But there is considerable merit in 
many of the other thoughtful approaches developed by Indian law scholars. 
The purpose of this part is to situate the plenary-power approach in the 
relevant academic literature and in doing so, to note specific points on which 
some of the other responses may not be fully persuasive or may not represent 
the best approach to defending federal Indian law.  
No previous work has considered the full implications of the 
congressional plenary power for the equal-protection requirement. But there 
have been a few references by Indian law scholars to the equal-protection 
deference that the Supreme Court gives to federal immigration law. Philip 
Frickey, writing shortly after Adarand, suggests that “in the field of 
immigration law and alienage regulation, in which the Court has accorded 
Congress a plenary power, the Court will be reluctant to upset longstanding 
 
268 See, e.g., Malabed v. N. Slope Borough, 42 F. Supp. 2d 927, 936–42 (D. Alaska 1999) 
(invalidating local government employment preference for Alaska Natives); Tafoya v. City 
of Albuquerque, 751 F. Supp. 1527, 1529–1531 (D.N.M. 1990) (invalidating city ordinance 
allowing only tribal Indians to sell wares within a specified city district). 
269 See, e.g., Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1214–16 (5th Cir. 
1991) (upholding an exemption under Texas law for Native American Church use of peyote 
in religious ceremonies). There is a cogent argument that Mancari applies to state-law 
classifications involving Indians and Indian tribes. The “political rather than racial in nature” 
rationale of Mancari does not depend, as an analytic matter, on what government makes the 
classification. If a federal classification involving Indians is “political rather than racial in 
nature,” so too is a state classification involving Indians. See, e.g., Williams, Indians as 
Peoples, supra note 125, at 865 (1991) (arguing that states should be able to use the “Indian” 
classification in the same manner as the federal government). Although the “unique 
obligations” rationale does not apply in the case of state laws, the Supreme Court has rejected 
equal-protection challenges to federal Indian laws on the basis of the “political rather than 
racial in nature” rationale alone, as in Antelope and Yakima Indian Nation. 




arrangements, even though they might arguably involve some discriminatory 
element.”270 Frickey then identifies the connection between federal 
immigration law and federal Indian law: 
Federal Indian law is, of course, also a field in which the Court 
has long accorded Congress plenary power. Indeed, in my 
judgment, it is far from a coincidence that plenary power exists 
in both immigration law and federal Indian law: there are parallel 
reasons for plenary power in both. Might this not leave Mancari 
good law despite its tension with Adarand? And if judicial 
deference remains the norm in federal Indian law, might not the 
courts defer to federal policies toward Indians even if . . . they 
do not fit within the four corners of Mancari?271 
But after drawing the analogy and provocatively asking about its equal-
protection implications, Frickey pursues the point no further. 
Similarly, an outstanding amicus curiae brief in Brackeen, written by 
Sarah Krakoff and Matthew L.M. Fletcher and filed on behalf of more than a 
dozen other prominent Indian-law scholars, argues that the Court’s treatment 
of the congressional plenary power over immigration policy under the equal-
protection requirement justifies corresponding equal-protection deference for 
federal Indian law: 
The [Supreme] Court’s approach to Congressional 
classifications in the Indian law context is similar to other 
areas where Congress’s lawmaking authority is broad or 
exclusive. In immigration law, Congress has “plenary power 
to make rules” for the admission and exclusion of aliens. . . . 
Courts reviewing equal protection challenges to immigration 
classifications therefore only inquire whether Congress had a 
“facially legitimate and bona fide reason.” . . . Similarly, 
congressional classifications rooted in the Constitution’s 
District and Territories Clauses are subject only to rational 
basis review. . . . As these cases reflect, there is nothing 
unusual in affording Congress leeway in areas where the 
Constitution has delegated broad and exclusive authority to 
the legislative branch.272 
But as with Frickey’s brief reference to the congressional plenary power over 
immigration policy, the amicus curiae brief does not examine the matter 
further. That of course is fully appropriate for an argument that a lower 
 
270 Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents, supra note 103, at 1766. 
271 Id. 
272 Brief of Indian Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants at 15–16, Brackeen 
v. Bernhardt, 937 F.3d 406 (5th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-11479) (internal citations omitted). 
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federal court should respect the Supreme Court’s decision in Mancari, but it 
leaves the plenary-power approach unexplored and undeveloped.273  
 
A. Responses within the Mancari Framework 
 
Several academic responses aim to justify or to rehabilitate Mancari. In 
a characteristically insightful article, Matthew L.M. Fletcher undertakes “to 
marry the holding in cases like Morton v. Mancari to the text and structure of the 
Constitution.”274 Fletcher says that “[i]t is the settled law of the land that when 
Congress legislates to fulfill its trust relationship with Indian tribes, Congress 
is entitled to significant deference,”275 a proposition that he calls the “political 
classification doctrine.”276 He reasons that, under the Indian Commerce Clause 
of Article I.277, the Indians Not Taxed Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,278 
and other constitutional provisions,279 Congress “first and foremost as a political 
matter decides which persons are Indians, and [Congress] must do so in 
deference to tribal membership or citizenship criteria.”280 Similarly, he says, 
Congress and the executive branch share constitutional authority for deciding 
“which entities constitute ‘Indian tribes.’”281  
Fletcher argues that because the Constitution assigns these 
determinations to the political branches, “federal (and state) legal 
classifications based on tribal membership and citizenship criteria based 
purely on Indian blood quantum and ancestry are valid under the 
Constitution.”282 More specifically, Fletcher notes that, like the decision 
whether to recognize a foreign state, the determination of tribal status has 
long been regarded as a political question for justiciability purposes.283 The 
 
273 In an earlier article, Krakoff, one of the authors of the brief, suggests that “Mancari has . 
. . become an extension of Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs . . . .” Krakoff, supra 
note 217, at 1059. And with skepticism, David Williams notes that the Supreme Court “could 
hold that the equal protection clause is not incorporated against the federal government when 
it comes to Indian tribes” so that “Indians would be like aliens: the equal protection clause 
[would] involve[] one standard for the central government and another for the states.” 
Williams, Indians as Peoples, supra note 125, at 810. 
274 Fletcher, supra note 200, at 504. 
275 Id. at 500. 
276 Id. Although other scholars use the term “political classification doctrine” to refer only to 
the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale of Mancari, Fletcher appears to use it to 
refer both to that rationale and the “unique obligation” rationale collectively.  
277 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
278 U.S. CONST., XIV amend., § 2. 
279 Fletcher, supra note 200, at 500, 506. 
280 Id. at 504. 
281 Id.  
282 Id.  
283 Id. at 504–05. 




Supreme Court effectively said as much in United States v. Sandoval,284 and 
it expressly said so in Baker v. Carr.285 Fletcher argues that the deference 
called for by Mancari is analogous to that called for by the political-question 
doctrine and that the federal courts should treat determinations about Indian 
status, even those made solely by reference to race or ancestry, as all but 
dispositive.286 In his view, the only role for the federal courts here is to ensure 
that the classifications involving Indians and Indian tribes made by the 
political branches are “rationally related to the duty of protection owed by the 
United States to Indians and Indian tribes.”287 
Fletcher is one of the leading contemporary thinkers about federal 
Indian law, and his effort to put Mancari on a more solid constitutional 
foundation deserves close attention from the federal courts. But one may still 
examine his argument to see whether any questions arise. Fletcher correctly 
maintains that in the first instance, the Constitution allocates the recognition 
of Indian tribes and determinations of tribal and Indian status to the legislative 
and executive branches.288 That much is clear, and that much is consistent 
with settled law. But the constitutional allocation of a particular function to 
Congress or to the president (or to Congress and the president together) does 
not necessarily make the exercise of that function unreviewable by the federal 
courts, and it does not necessarily imply that the federal courts must review the 
exercise of that function under a deferential standard. As John Harrison notes: 
“All of Congress’s powers are committed to it by the text [of the Constitution], 
yet most exercises of those powers do not give rise to political questions.”289 
What, then, is special about determinations of tribal status and Indian 
status that entitles those determinations to what Fletcher calls “a very 
deferential standard of review from Article III courts”?290 Determinations 
about tribal status are easy; according to the Supreme Court, recognition of 
Indian tribes is covered by the political-question doctrine.291 But Fletcher 
 
284 United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913). 
285 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215–17 (1962); see John Harrison, The Political Question 
Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 461 (2017) (noting that recognition of tribal status is a 
political question). As with certain other political questions, the deference of the federal 
courts on determinations of tribal status is not absolute; as the Court noted in Baker v. Carr (citing 
Sandoval), a determination of tribal status must involve a group that is “distinctly Indian,” and 
“the courts will strike down any heedless extension of that label.” 369 U.S. at 216–17. 
286 Fletcher, supra note 200, at 519. 
287 Id. at 505. 
288 Id. at 504. 
289 Harrison, supra note 285, at 500. 
290 Fletcher, supra note 200, at 504. 
291 For some reason, Fletcher pulls his punch here. He argues that “[t]he federal government’s 
decision to acknowledge Indian tribes as sovereigns to which the United States owes a duty 
of protection is akin to a nonjusticiable political question.” Id. at 522 (emphasis added). But 
under Sandoval and Baker, a determination of tribal status is actually a political question. 
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215–17 (1962).  
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aims more broadly. He rejects what he calls the “compromise position,” 
which concedes deferential review for classifications involving Indian tribes 
but not for classifications involving Indians.292 The compromise position, he 
says, animated the district court’s decision in Brackeen, holding that ICWA 
is unconstitutional because the statute’s definition of “Indian child” reaches 
beyond enrolled tribal members.293 For Fletcher, there must also be a basis 
for deference to classifications involving individual Indians. 
Fletcher makes two arguments in support of this point. First is an 
argument from the text and the structure of the Constitution: 
The Constitution denies Article III courts the power to review 
decisions made by Congress and the executive branch 
recognizing . . . Indian tribes. I argue the Constitution also 
denies Article III courts the full power to review decisions 
made by Congress and the executive branch recognizing and 
classifying individual Indians. The relevant Constitutional 
texts are the Indians Not Taxed Clause and the [Indian] 
Commerce Clause. The structural argument rests with the fact 
that the Constitution leaves the concurrent powers to define 
“Indians not taxed” and “Indian tribes” to the federal and state 
political branches.294 
That is, “[t]he Constitution authorizes and requires the federal government to 
define who is Indian.”295 Again, this is simply the argument that, because the 
Constitution allocates a particular function to one (or both) of the political 
branches, the courts must stand down; again, that argument is problematic. 
Article I allocates the legislative power of the United States to Congress, but 
the courts do not—and cannot, consistent with Marbury v. Madison296—give 
general deference to Congress in its legislative determinations. Similarly, 
Article II allocates the executive power of the United States to the president, 
but the courts do not give general deference to the executive branch. As 
Harrison says, most exercises of congressional Article I powers “do not give 
rise to political questions.”297 The same is true of most exercises of 
presidential Article II powers. Calling a determination of Indian status a 
“political choice”298 does not rescue the position. Almost every decision 
 
292 Fletcher, supra note 200, at 502–04. 
293 Id. at 502–03. For an example of the “compromise position” in the academic literature, 
see Eugene Volokh, The California Civil Rights Initiative: An Interpretive Guide, 44 UCLA L. 
REV. 1335, 1359 (1997) (arguing that “classifications based on Indian-tribe membership” are 
not “based on race” but that “[c]lassifications based only on being an Indian” are “racial”). 
294 Fletcher, supra note 200, at 520. 
295 Id. 
296 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). 
297 Harrison, supra note 285, at 500. 
298 Fletcher, supra note 200, at 520. 




made by Congress or the president is a political choice; they are, after all, the 
political branches. A political choice is distinct from a political question. 
Second, Fletcher argues that the meaning of the term “Indian” is 
“inherently and necessarily political.”299 This is a normative argument. 
Fletcher says that the deference provided to determinations about tribal status 
under the political-question doctrine “must” apply also to determinations 
about Indian status and that such determinations “should” be reviewed under 
the rational-basis standard.300 He supports the position by analogizing Indians 
to foreigners, by invoking the wide latitude of Congress to define the scope 
of the federal government’s duty of protection to Indians and Indian tribes, 
by suggesting a parallel between determinations of Indian status and tribal 
status, and by questioning the institutional capacity of the judiciary to make 
decisions about Indian status.301 
Again, Fletcher offers a deeply intriguing defense of federal Indian 
law against the equal-protection challenge. That said, three specific concerns, 
which arise under both his textual-structural argument and his normative 
argument, merit consideration. First, to say that a determination about tribal 
status or Indian status is a political classification is not necessarily to say that 
such a determination is not also a racial classification. Fletcher assumes a 
sharp dichotomy on this point. He reasons: “The text of the Constitution itself 
demands that Congress determine who is an ‘Indian’ for the purposes of 
regulating commerce and apportionment. Classifications of Indian status, 
thus, are not impermissible race-based classifications but rather 
constitutionally mandated political determinations.”302 This is similar to the 
move that the Supreme Court made in Mancari with the “political rather than 
racial in nature” rationale.  
But the underlying “either-or” assumption has not been justified. A 
status determination can be both political and racial, just as it can be both 
political and religious—in the case, for example, of a legislative 
determination to define who qualifies as a Christian and then to treat all 
Christians favorably or unfavorably under federal law. Fletcher labors 
mightily (and in my view successfully) to demonstrate that determinations 
about Indian status are essentially political, both because those 
determinations are made by the political branches and because they have 
political attributes and political implications.303 But that does not mean that 
those determinations are not also racial. That, after all, is the fundamental 
and longstanding objection to the Mancari “political rather than racial in 
nature” rationale. 
 
299 Id. at 532 
300 Id. at 532–33.  
301 Id. at 532–44.  
302 Id. at 532. 
303 Id. at 532–44. 
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Second, judicial deference to a legislative or administrative 
determination about tribal status or Indian status is only judicial deference to 
the determination about status. It is not deference to the entire legislative or 
administrative project in which the status determination is situated, and it 
does not deprive the federal courts of Article III jurisdiction over any case or 
controversy that may involve or even turn on resolution of the political 
question. Even under the strongest form of the political-question doctrine, 
only the political question itself is non-justiciable; other legal questions that 
depend on the outcome of the political question remain fully justiciable. The 
answer provided by Congress or the president to a political question becomes 
a “datum” that the courts treat as conclusive, but the courts still adjudicate 
any claim incorporating that datum.304 As Harrison writes: “Because of the 
political question doctrine, the decision of a non-judicial actor can provide a 
premise that the court uses in a decision on the merits.”305 
To put the point in terms of the Brackeen decision about the 
constitutionality of ICWA, even complete deference by the federal courts to 
the congressional decision about who is an “Indian” and who is an “Indian 
child” only reaches the question of who is an “Indian” and who is an “Indian 
child.” That deference precludes the courts from reviewing where Congress 
chose to draw lines in defining “Indian” and “Indian child.” But the deference 
would not make the ICWA equal-protection issue non-justiciable. Even 
accepting without question or review the congressional definitions of 
“Indian” and “Indian child,” the federal courts would still have to determine 
whether the use of those definitions in the statute satisfy the equal-protection 
requirement. The two points are distinct, and only the former would be 
covered by political-question deference.    
 Third, the Supreme Court itself has indicated that, although 
determinations of tribal status are political questions, determinations about 
Indian status are squarely within the competency of the federal courts to 
review and to adjudicate. Baker v. Carr, citing and quoting Sandoval, said 
that the “Court’s deference to the political departments in determining 
whether Indians are recognized as a tribe” is subject to the limitation that 
 
304 Harrison, supra note 285, at 485–87. In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court illustrated this 
point by reference to Worcester v. Georgia, one of the foundational cases in federal Indian 
law. The Court said that, in Worcester, “the fact that the tribe was a separate polity served as a 
datum contributing to the result, and despite the consequences in a heated federal-state 
controversy and the opposition of the other branches of the National Government, the judicial 
power acted to reverse the State Supreme Court.” Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 215 n.43 (1962). 
305 Harrison, supra note 285, at 487; see also id. at 496 (“Justiciability is distinct from subject 
matter jurisdiction in that a court can have jurisdiction to decide a case that turns on 
nonjusticiability, and indeed a court can award relief in a case in which an issue is 
nonjusticiable. When a plaintiff with a meritorious claim relies on the political branches’ 
recognition of a foreign government, for example, the political question doctrine underlies 
part of the court’s reasoning in a successful suit.”). 




Congress may not “‘bring a community or body of people within the range 
of [the congressional plenary] power by arbitrarily calling them an Indian 
tribe.’”306 And then the Court drove the point home that the federal courts do 
not defer to the political branches on Indian status: “Able to discern what is 
‘distinctly Indian,’ . . . the courts will strike down any heedless extension of 
that label.”307 There is good reason for this differential treatment of 
determinations of tribal status and determinations of Indian status. Unlike 
determinations of tribal status, determinations of Indian status do not involve 
“questions of sovereignty and relations among sovereigns”—one of the limited 
categories in which the political-question doctrine “attribute[s] finality to 
political actors’ application of law to fact.”308 Thus, the step from political-
question deference for determinations of tribal status to political-question 
deference for determinations of Indian status is neither short nor simple.309 
 
306 369 U.S. at 215–16 (quoting United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913)).  
307 Id. at 216–17 (quoting United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913)).  
308 Harrison, supra note 285, at 460. The other two categories are cases that involve “the process 
of legal enactment” and cases for which “the Constitution explicitly designates a house of 
Congress as judge, either of its own members’ elections or of impeachments in the Senate.” Id. 
309 In setting up his argument, Fletcher praises a recent article by Gregory Ablavsky as a 
“game-changer” in the application of the equal-protection requirement to federal Indian law.  
Fletcher, supra note 200, at 503. Ablavsky’s article attempts to recover the historical 
meanings of the words “tribe” and “Indian” as used in the Indian Commerce Clause and the 
(original) Indians Not Taxed Clause. See generally Ablavsky, supra note 165.  Ablavsky 
finds that “Anglo-Americans of the late eighteenth century” used “Indian” both as a political 
classification and as a racial classification. Id. at 1068–69. He argues that, to the extent the 
use of the word “Indian” in the Constitution is understood in racial terms, the notion of a 
“colorblind Constitution” is compromised: “[I]f we abandon the legal fiction that ‘Indian’ is 
a political classification, we must also give up the larger fiction of a colorblind Constitution. 
Under this interpretation, race is literally written into the text of our Constitution.” Id. at 
1073. From this, Ablavsky concludes that the equal-protection challenge to federal Indian 
law must fail: “It is very hard to argue that a classification is unconstitutional when it is 
mandated by the Constitution itself. This reading strongly suggests that with respect to those 
people labeled ‘Indians,’ the Constitution itself authorizes distinctions based on ancestry.” 
Id. at 1074. This reasoning is perhaps not as tight as one might wish. That the text of the 
Constitution incorporates a distinguishing characteristic of individuals or a group of 
individuals does not mean that any legislation classifying individuals or a group of 
individuals on the basis of that characteristic is exempt from the equal-protection 
requirement. The Nineteenth Amendment, for example, prohibits the denial of voting rights 
“on account of sex,” but Congress does not have a general license to draw distinctions on the 
basis of sex without regard to the equal-protection requirement. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. It 
does, however, mean that legislation enacted under a grant of constitutional power for which 
the Constitution uses that characteristic to define the scope of the power must be reconciled 
with the equal-protection requirement. This is true of the congressional plenary power over 
immigration, the exercise of which necessarily involves classifications on the basis of 
alienage, and it is true of the congressional plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes, the 
exercise of which involves classifications on the basis of race. 
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Bethany Berger offers a nuanced and innovative equal-protection 
argument that, like Fletcher’s argument, attempts to justify Mancari. Berger 
maintains that the core of federal Indian law defines the terms of a sovereign-
to-sovereign relationship between the federal government and the recognized 
Indian tribes “rather than the relationship of sovereigns to disadvantaged 
individuals that characterizes equal protection claims.”310 She argues that “an 
antidiscrimination norm lies at the heart of equal protection” and that laws 
restoring and furthering tribal sovereignty “are consistent with” the general 
equal-protection objective “of undermining state-sanctioned racial 
discrimination.”311 In other words, Berger says, “federal Indian policies are 
normatively consistent with equal protection.”312  
Berger maintains that the “political rather than racial in nature” 
rationale of Mancari does not “posit[] a counterfactual nonracial status for 
Indian people” but instead “demonstrat[es] the ways the classification 
fulfilled the goals emerging from the unique federal relationship” with 
Indians and Indian tribes.313 Generalizing this point, Berger argues that 
legislation advancing the interests of tribal sovereignty “is consistent with the 
spirit of equal protection because it partially reverses discrimination against 
tribal governments by restoring a measure of their territorial sovereignty.”314 
And so, despite misgivings about what she sees as the Supreme Court’s 
failure “[to] build on [the] potential” of Mancari,315 Berger argues that Indian 
preferences—laws that “respond to and partially undo the denial of equal 
political rights founded in racialized images of native peoples”—“further the 
goals of equal protection” and should be considered constitutional.316 
Berger’s argument is an heroic effort to meet the equal-protection 
challenge, but it necessarily marginalizes many of the cases that ground the 
challenge. Berger reads the Equal Protection Clause as proscribing only 
governmental discrimination that harms historically disadvantaged groups, 
such as African Americans, but as permitting governmental discrimination 
that benefits such historically disadvantaged groups.317 Of course, if current 
equal-protection doctrine conformed to that reading of the Equal Protection 
Clause, there would be no equal-protection challenge to federal Indian law in 
the first place—nor, for that matter, would there be any equal-protection 
challenge to governmental affirmative action. Berger acknowledges that her 
starting point, although shared by many other scholars and commentators, 
 
310 Berger, supra note 125, at 1168.  
311 Id. at 1169. 
312 Id. at 1170. 
313 Id. at 1186. 
314 Id. at 1193.  
315 Id. at 1187.  
316 Id. at 1189.  
317 Id. at 1196. 




remains highly contested and that her reading of the Equal Protection Clause 
has found little traction “in other areas.”318 Nonetheless, she argues that the 
antidiscrimination norm is what informs the Mancari “political rather than 
racial in nature” rationale.319 She maintains that the Court used the “political 
rather than racial in nature” rationale to uphold the BIA employment 
preference in Mancari precisely because the preference was benign with 
respect to Indian tribes—that is, because it promoted tribal sovereignty.320  
Again, it is an intriguing argument, and it may be normatively right. 
But it holds limited promise as a strategy for defending federal Indian law in 
the federal courts. The argument effectively dismisses Bakke and Adarand, 
which raise serious doctrinal concerns about affirmative-action programs;321 
it effectively dismisses Antelope, which applies the “political rather than 
racial in nature” rationale equally to legislation favoring Indians and 
legislation disfavoring Indians; and it effectively dismisses the concerns 
raised by the federal judges who have expressed sympathy for the equal-
protection challenge. Ultimately, Berger is making the case to those who 
already share a particular anti-subordination understanding of the equal-
protection requirement. But the argument likely will have little effect on 
those, such as Chief Justice Roberts, who read the Equal Protection Clause 
as mandating a color-blind approach—who maintain that “[t]he way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race.”322 In short, Berger does not really meet the equal-protection challenge 
to federal Indian law on its own terms. Instead, she maintains that the entire 
analytic critique of affirmative action and other legislation benefitting 
historically disadvantaged groups has misunderstood the Equal Protection 
Clause. Again, the argument might be normatively right, but its prospects for 
success as a litigation strategy are open to question. 
Addie Rolnick challenges the Mancari “political rather than racial in 
nature” rationale, although her general purpose is to argue against the 
conceptual deficiencies of the rationale itself rather than the outcomes that it 
produces.323 Rolnick rejects the “oppositional framing” of Mancari—the 
political-racial dichotomy; she argues that the term “Indian” denotes “both a 
 
318 Id. at 1170. 
319 Id. at 1183–88. 
320 Id. at 1186. 
321 In fact, the constitutional difficulties with affirmative action run even to affirmative action 
that is “race-neutral” on the surface. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications 
of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331, 2333 (2000) (arguing that race-
neutral efforts to increase minority representation in higher education may constitute “race-
conscious state action that may violate the Equal Protection Clause”). 
322 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007). 
323 See generally Rolnick, supra note 217 (exploring “the legal roots of the political 
classification doctrine, its ongoing significance, and the descriptive limits and normative 
consequences of the ideas that it contains”). 
           Journal of Law and Public Affairs       [Nov. 2020 
 
   
 
66 
racial category and the unique political history of Indian tribes.”324 She says 
that Mancari, although wrong in suggesting a clean distinction between 
Indian status as a political classification and Indian status as a racial 
classification, remains useful in protecting federal Indian law from the equal-
protection challenge.325 Still, she says, the “legal ideology” exemplified by 
Mancari conceals “the relationship between Indian racialization and tribal 
political status,” and it frustrates understanding of “the anti-racist potential of 
federal Indian law in light of Indian racial subordination.”326 
Rolnick aims less to justify Mancari than to push beyond it. She 
argues that the “problems” confronting Indians and Indian tribes cannot “be 
adequately addressed without attention to both the racial and the political 
elements . . . and the mutually constitutive relationship between them.”327 She 
prefers not to treat federal Indian law as “separate from and antithetical to 
issues of race” but instead to “engage[] the impact of both racialization and 
political rights.”328 Rolnick argues for a “conceptual reframing” of both 
elements of the Mancari framework—both the “political” and the “racial”—
to yield a “less restrictive interpretation” of Indian law.329 She develops this 
framework in two moves. First, she argues that contemporary hostility toward 
Indians and Indian tribes implicates “racialized ideas about Indians” and 
works to deny the exercise of specifically Indian political rights (such as tribal 
sovereignty and reserved hunting and fishing rights).330 Second, she argues 
that the protection of Indian political rights becomes “an important tool of 
anti-racism.”331 But her goal, she insists, is “doctrinally modest”—simply to 
provide greater context for the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale 
so that courts might avoid narrow applications of Mancari.332  
 Finally, Carole Goldberg describes an argument in defense of Indian 
law that takes the “political rather than racial in nature” rationale seriously.333 
She presents the argument with some hesitation; she never fully endorses it, 
and, in fact, she astutely identifies many of its shortcomings. Goldberg 
characterizes the argument as maintaining that “Indian classifications are 
political, not racial, so long as they turn on tribal citizenship rather than 
ancestry” and that “Indian classifications are no different from permissible 
 
324 Id. at 967. 
325 Id. at 969. 
326 Id. 
327 Id. at 1026. 
328 Id. 
329 Id. at 1028. 
330 Id. 
331 Id. 
332 Id. at 1029. 
333 Goldberg, supra note 75, at 958. She identifies the argument primarily with Eugene 
Volokh. See generally Volokh, supra note 293 (discussing legal framework for 
discrimination claims). 




classifications based on U.S. or foreign citizenship and should be tested by 
the same relaxed equal protection standard.”334 Goldberg finds “much to 
commend” here but points out that the “political rather than racial in nature” 
rationale “encounters some difficulties,”335 including the chronically 
troubling point that tribal-membership criteria ordinarily require Indian 
ancestry.336 Goldberg argues that “[f]ormal, inflexible ancestry requirements 
. . . are not part of the historic practice of tribes” but instead were introduced 
into tribal laws and customs under pressure from the federal government, 
“which was concerned with restricting eligibility for federal benefits and 
special Indian status.”337 For that reason, she argues, “classifications that turn 
on tribal citizenship could be characterized as race or ancestry plus 
classifications, which would return us to the challenges from anti-affirmative 
action forces.”338 Goldberg also notes that linking a relaxed standard of 
review to membership in a recognized Indian tribe provides no equal-
protection relief for federal laws concerning non-tribal Indians or conferring 
initial recognition on an Indian tribe.339 
 
B. Responses Rejecting the Applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
Another group of responses argues that the Fourteenth Amendment 
generally and the Equal Protection Clause specifically do not apply to laws 
covering Indian tribes or their members. Although scholars have presented 
this argument in several different versions, the basic idea is reasonably 
straightforward. The framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, according to this 
argument, considered Indian tribes and tribal members to be separate from 
the general citizenry of the United States and of the individual states. 
Although the Equal Protection Clause has always applied to the states (and at 
least since Bolling v. Sharpe in 1954, to the federal government as well), 
many Indian tribes still inhabited lands outside the borders of the states at the 
 
334 Goldberg, supra note 75, at 958. This is in effect the theory that Fletcher criticizes as the 
“compromise position.” Fletcher, supra note 200, at 502–03.  
335 Goldberg, supra note 75, at 959. 
336 Id. at, 960–63. 
337 Id. at 961. 
338 Id. (emphasis in original). 
339 Id. at 963–966. There are other academic responses within the Mancari framework. See, 
e.g., Krakoff, supra note 217, at 1122–24 (justifying Mancari on a harm-correction reading 
of the equal-protection requirement); Newton, supra note 103, at 286–88 (arguing that 
exclusively racial classifications of Indians should fall outside the Mancari framework and 
that laws involving classifications of Indian tribes should be treated as discriminatory 
whenever those laws adversely affect tribes); Johnson & Crystal, supra note 42 (arguing for 
modification to the Mancari framework by requiring stricter scrutiny of laws not advancing 
the federal government’s trust responsibility to Indians and Indian tribes). 
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time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868.340 Also, many tribal 
Indians, whether or not living within an existing state, were not U.S. citizens 
in 1868—a point recognized obliquely in the text of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. And so, the argument runs, the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment never intended the Equal Protection Clause to cover Indian 
tribes or tribal members—not directly, as a constraint on state governments, 
and not indirectly, as a constraint on the federal government. 
David Williams provides an early and clear articulation of this 
position. Williams argues that the Equal Protection Clause “does not run to 
Indians under tribal relations because the clause itself considers them to be a 
separate people.”341 The critical point, in his view, is tribal sovereignty. To 
the extent that the federal government respects tribal sovereignty, the Equal 
Protection Clause does not apply to laws concerning Indian tribes and tribal 
members; to the extent that the federal government overrides tribal 
sovereignty, “the strict standards of the equal protection clause should come 
to control government actions.”342 Williams argues that even if the 
government “may not use racial classifications” in those places where “the 
writ of the equal protection clause runs,” the “writ has never been extended 
to Indian Country.”343 In his view, “[t]he domestic morality of the clause has 
no more applicability to Indian reservations than it does to Sweden or 
Nicaragua, because all of that territory is still under the governance of 
different cultural concepts and has never been fully and permanently invaded 
by American ideological imperialism.”344 
This argument is not primarily normative; Williams finds support for 
his conclusions in both the text and the history of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The text treats tribal Indians as separate from non-tribal Indians and non-
Indians. Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in determining the 
apportionment of representatives among the states, excludes “Indians not 
taxed.”345 And section 1, in confirming U.S. citizenship for “[a]ll persons 
born or naturalized in the United States,” specifically requires that such 
persons be “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States—a provision, 
Williams argues, that was meant to exclude tribal Indians.346 Williams 
maintains that the “two phrases—‘Indians not taxed’ and Indians ‘not subject 
to the jurisdiction’ of the United States—turn out to have identical 
 
340 Those tribes lived in the Department of Alaska and in U.S. territories that later would 
become the states of Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming.  
341 Williams, Indians as Peoples, supra note 125, at 763. 
342 Id.  
343 Id. at 831. 
344 Id. 
345 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 2. 
346 Id. at § 1. 




meanings.”347 In the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866, he says, 
members of Congress wanted to distinguish between “two vaguely imagined 
categories of Indians—‘wild’ Indians and ‘domesticated’ ones.”348 The 
language settled on to make the distinction—roughly but imperfectly 
corresponding to a distinction between tribal and non-tribal Indians—was 
that the former were “not taxed.”349 Later, in debating the language for 
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Williams says, members of 
Congress used the term “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States as 
the equivalent of excluding “Indians not taxed.”350 
Thus, Williams argues, the framers specifically intended to exclude 
tribal Indians from the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.351 They did so 
using somewhat indirect and imprecise language about taxation and 
jurisdiction, but their objective, as expressed in debates over the language of 
the amendment, is clear. Even if tribal Indians were subject to the overriding 
sovereignty of the United States, they also were subject to the sovereignty of 
their tribes. For that reason, tribal Indians constituted “a separate people” who 
were not fully subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and who were 
therefore outside the Fourteenth Amendment.352 “And,” Williams argues, 
“that status did not change even if the federal government had asserted some 
jurisdiction over them, as long as it had not destroyed their tribal 
government.”353 The rule that Williams distills from the history of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, then, is that the Equal Protection Clause does not 
apply to any “Indian-specific legislation” that is “consistent with” the 
 
347 Williams, Indians as Peoples, supra note 125, at 832. 
348 Id. at 833.  
349 Id. at 833–36. 
350 Id. at 836–38. 
351 Id. at 838. 
352 Id. 
353 Id. Williams allows that the understanding of legal commentators during the 
Reconstruction Era was that the Equal Protection Clause did have some application to 
Indians “but only in a unique and limited way.” Id. at 841. Those commentators, he says, 
thought that although Indians did not have the “rights of citizens,” the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Due Process Clause nonetheless guaranteed “rights of personal security and 
legal redress to ‘persons’ and not citizens.” Id. Without providing much specificity, he 
elaborates that application of the Equal Protection Clause “was limited by the extent of the 
Indians’ allegiance; they were entitled to receive some protection because they were 
somewhat exposed to federal power. That limited jurisdiction and limited protection in no 
way interfered with their separate status under federal law as members of semiforeign 
sovereigns.” Id. Of course, this concession raises more questions than it answers. To argue 
that the Equal Protection Clause applied in some manner to tribal Indians but not to indicate 
how it applied to them is to leave open the question of whether laws differentiating tribal 
Indians from others might trigger heightened scrutiny. That is the question at the heart of the 
equal-protection challenge to federal Indian law.  
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“peoplehood” of Indians.354 He maintains that this exempts from heightened 
equal-protection scrutiny any legislation that promotes tribal sovereignty and 
tribal self-determination as well as any legislation that does not “positively 
contradict” tribal sovereignty or tribal self-determination.355 By contrast, it 
does not permit legislation that singles Indians out for treatment as racially 
inferior to non-Indians. Legislation of that nature, Williams maintains, must 
be reviewed under the strict-scrutiny standard.356 
The argument is interesting and, as to the status quo in 1868, possibly 
compelling. But the equal-protection challenge to federal Indian law is not 
about the state of affairs in 1868; it is about the state of affairs today, and 
much has changed since the Reconstruction Period. Every recognized Indian 
tribe is now located within the boundaries of one of the states; Congress 
extended U.S. citizenship to (or, depending on one’s view, imposed U.S. 
citizenship on) all Indians in 1924;357 and the Supreme Court definitively 
confirmed in 1954 that the equal-protection requirement applies not only to 
state government but also to the federal government. Williams argues that 
 
354 Id. at 845. 
355 Id. 
356 Id. at 844. 
357 George Beck argues that federal legislation extending U.S. citizenship to tribal Indians is 
unconstitutional, but his argument is not persuasive. See George Beck, The Fourteenth 
Amendment as Related to Tribal Indians: Section I, “Subject to the Jurisdiction Thereof” 
and Section II, “Excluding Indians Not Taxed,” 28 AM. INDIAN CULTURE & RES. J. 37, 57 
(2004) (“The doctrine represents raw political power without a solid constitutional basis. It 
is unconstitutional because it violates the Fourteenth Amendment.”). Beck works from the 
citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that “[a]ll persons born or 
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The core 
of Beck’s argument is as follows. First, Beck notes that the citizenship clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, by using the words “and subject to the jurisdiction thereof,” 
excludes tribal Indians. Beck, supra at 52. That was certainly true when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified, as the Supreme Court confirmed in 1884. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 
U.S. 94, 102 (1884) (holding that tribal Indians are not subject to the jurisdiction of the 
United States simply by reason of birth within the territorial limits of the United States). 
Second, Beck notes that the Supreme Court ruled in 1967 that because of the citizenship 
clause, the federal government cannot strip a natural-born citizen of U.S. citizenship. Beck, 
supra at 49. See generally Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967). Third, Beck argues that 
“[b]y similar constitutional reasoning, Indian citizenship, explicitly forbidden by the 
Fourteenth Amendment, is also beyond legislative authority of Congress to alter by the 
general power granted in the Naturalization Clause.” Beck, at 50 (emphasis added). This last 
step is not valid. A rule that Congress cannot take away citizenship that has been conferred 
by the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not imply a rule that Congress 
cannot confer citizenship that has not been conferred by the citizenship clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Beck in effect reads the proviso in the citizenship clause—“and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof”—as an outright prohibition on tribal Indians ever 
acquiring U.S. citizenship through any means other than a later constitutional amendment. 
That is simply not what Elk v. Wilkins, Afroyim v. Rusk, and the citizenship clause say.  




Congress understood the reference to “Indians not taxed” in section 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to be the equivalent of excluding persons not 
“subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States from citizenship under 
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.358 But even if that was correct in 
1868, there are no longer any people who meet that description. All American 
Indians, whether tribal members or not and whether living within or without 
Indian country, are subject to taxation by the federal government, and all 
American Indians, whether tribal members or not and whether living within 
or without Indian country, are subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.359 Williams’ argument is good so far as it goes, but somewhere 
between 1868 and the present, it encounters very serious difficulties.360 
Ultimately, the argument works as a response to the equal-protection 
challenge only if one assumes that the Fourteenth Amendment lays down a 
rule that Indian tribes and their members, because they were not citizens and 
were not subject to taxation in 1868, would never be covered by the Equal 
Protection Clause—regardless of whether Indians later became citizens, 
regardless of whether Indians later became subject to taxation, regardless of 
whether tribal lands later became geographically incorporated into existing 
and future states, and regardless of whether the federal government itself later 
became subject to the equal-protection requirement. Williams adduces strong 
evidence about what Congress intended for 1868 but no evidence at all about 
what Congress intended for the century and a half that followed.361 
 
 
358 Williams, Indians as Peoples, supra note 125, at 832–33.  
359 If tribal Indians are not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, how could Congress 
have granted universal citizenship to American Indians in 1924?  And what would have been 
the authority for Congress to enact Title 25 of the United States Code? 
360 Williams tries to address the legal developments after the ratification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but his arguments never come to terms with the integration of tribal members 
into contemporary American political life. Williams, Indians as Peoples, supra note 125, at 
850–64. Tribal citizens today are really dual citizens, and there is no reason to think that they 
are any more beyond the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment than any other dual citizens 
present in the United States.  
361 For other arguments rejecting the applicability of the Fourteenth Amendment, in whole 
or in part, to tribal Indians, see, e.g., Abi Fain and Mary Kathryn Nagle, Close to Zero: The 
Reliance on Minimum Blood Quantum Requirements to Eliminate Tribal Citizenship in the 
Allotment Acts and the Post-Adoptive Couple Challenges to the Constitutionality of ICWA, 
43 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 801, 815–22 (2017) (arguing that the framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment “never intended for the Amendment’s prohibitions on the use of race 
as a criterion to prohibit the federal government from enacting legislation that relies on ‘Indian’ 
as a classification”); Berger, supra note 125, at 1171–79 (“Throughout the Reconstruction era, 
we find a persistent sense of the consistency of Indian and tribal rights with equal protection’s 
goals, and a conviction that the Fourteenth Amendment should not undermine them.”); Clinton, 
supra note 75, at 1011–12 n.201 (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment “was not intended 
to change the relationship between the tribes and the federal government”). 
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C. Responses under the Indian Commerce Clause 
 
Finally, there have been scholarly responses to the equal-protection 
challenge that, although distinct from the plenary-power approach set forth 
in this paper, draw on the Indian Commerce Clause. Carole Goldberg, for 
example, argues that “the equal protection requirements of the Constitution 
have only limited application to federal Indian legislation, because the Indian 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution specifically authorizes the exercise of 
federal power with respect to tribes in particular.”362 Goldberg observes that 
the Indian Commerce Clause “envisions measures addressed specifically to 
Indian nations” but that the “equal protection provisions of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments dictate equal treatment in very general terms.”363 
This, she says, implicates the interpretive canon that “more specific 
provisions should control over more general provisions” and forces the 
conclusion that “the language of the Indian Commerce Clause should allow 
federal legislation directed at Indian tribes without triggering the strictest 
form of scrutiny under Fifth Amendment equal protection.”364 
 This argument is open to question. Section 8 of Article I of the 
Constitution confers a number of specific powers on Congress in addition to 
the plenary power that the Court has located in the Indian Commerce Clause. 
It cannot be that because these powers are framed in specific terms, they are 
exempt from the Equal Protection Clause, which is framed in general terms. 
Consider the very first congressional power mentioned in Section 8—the 
“Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises.”365 The 
Taxing Clause is at least as specific as the Indian Commerce Clause. Under 
Goldberg’s reasoning, the equal-protection requirement would “have only 
limited application to federal [tax] legislation, because the [Taxing] Clause 
of the Constitution specifically authorizes the exercise of federal power with 
respect to [taxation] in particular.” If Goldberg’s argument were correct, 
Congress would be free to impose higher rates of taxation on Asian 
Americans or Roman Catholics, for example, than on persons who fall 
outside either of those suspect classifications. 
Similarly, Section 8 of Article I grants Congress the power “[t]o 
provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of 
 
362 Goldberg, supra note 75, at 966. See also Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 125, at 172 
(arguing that “[b]ecause [A]rticle I of the Constitution specifically authorizes Congress to 
determine federal policy towards Indian tribes, strict scrutiny analysis [of equal protection] 
is simply irrelevant”). 
363 Goldberg, supra note 75, at 967. 
364 Id.; cf. Clinton, supra note 75, at 1015 (“The mere existence of the Indian [C]ommerce 
[C]lause suggests that special legislation for the nation’s indigenous peoples is 
constitutionally justified even if it involves racial classification.”). 
365 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1. 




the United States”366—again, on Goldberg’s argument, opening the path for 
Congress to prescribe harsher criminal penalties for counterfeiters who are 
Asian American or Roman Catholic than for other counterfeiters. And on the 
analysis would run—through all the other specific powers conferred on 
Congress by the Constitution, from the Interstate Commerce Clause through 
the clause granting Congress the exclusive power to legislate for the District of 
Columbia. Goldberg’s argument that the specific language of the Indian 
Commerce Clause in Article I trumps the general language of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment effectively makes most (perhaps all) federal legislation on 
any subject immune from strict scrutiny under the equal-protection requirement. 
In attempting to save federal Indian law from the equal-protection challenge, 
Goldberg’s position would effectively overrule Bolling v. Sharpe. 
Additionally, Goldberg’s argument would generally deny Indians and 
Indian tribes the protections against federal power provided by the Bill of 
Rights. Goldberg reads the Indian Commerce Clause of Article I as “specific” 
and the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as “general,” and she 
maintains that the specific must trump the general.367 But other provisions in 
the Bill of Rights are also general, such as the First Amendment’s guarantee of 
“freedom of speech,” the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
“unreasonable searches and seizures,” the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of 
“just compensation” for takings, and the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against “cruel and unusual punishments.” On Goldberg’s reasoning, those 
“general” constitutional rights would not constrain the federal government in 
its exercise of the “specific” power granted by the Indian Commerce Clause—
with the effect that Congress, when legislating as to Indians and Indian tribes, 
could deny free speech, provide for arbitrary searches and seizures, take 
property without compensation, and impose cruel and unusual punishments.  
And even if there might be reasonable disagreements about whether 
one or more of the provisions in the Bills of Rights are not so general as to 
give way to the Indian Commerce Clause, remember that Goldberg’s 
argument turns on her claim that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment must give way to the Indian Commerce Clause. But the Due 
Process Clause is what ensures that the federal government cannot deprive 
any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”368 Does  
anyone really want to maintain that, in exercising its plenary power over 
Indians and Indian tribes, Congress can deprive Indians of life, liberty, or 
property without due process of law? 
 
 
366 Id. at cl. 6. 
367 Goldberg, supra note 75, at 966–67. 
368 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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Certain problems presented by contemporary federal Indian law defy 
straightforward resolution, but the equal-protection challenge does not. 
Established Supreme Court case law points to the congressional plenary 
power over Indians and Indian tribes as the critical determinant of how the 
Equal Protection Clause should be applied to Indians and Indian tribes. Just 
as with the congressional plenary power over immigration, the congressional 
plenary power over Indians and Indian tribes precludes use of the strict-
scrutiny standard and compels use of a rational-basis standard of review. It is 
rank nonsense to insist, as the Court has maintained since the nineteenth 
century, that Congress has plenary and exclusive power over Indians and 
Indian tribes but then to treat the distinctions drawn by Congress between 
Indians and non-Indians as suspect classifications. The Supreme Court avoids 
that result in matters involving aliens and naturalized citizens; it should avoid 
that result in the parallel matters involving Indians or Indian tribes. Properly 
analyzed, the equal-protection challenge presents no legitimate threat to 
federal Indian law. 
 
